Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations: An Account of Muslims’ Responses by Ismail, Faisal
STUilIAISLAIIIKA
IND0NESIAI{ JouRNAL FoR rsLAMrc sTUDIES
.
Volume 3. Number 4. 1996
PRNcRSITR AS THE SOTr BnSIS FOR ALL POLITICAL PRNTITS AND FOR RlI MNSS
ORCnTIZRTIONS; AN ACCOUTr OF MUSLIMS, RESPONSES
Faisal lsrnail
DOES TRRorrronRL lSLAMtc MRi-Rv LtrrnRrune Corurntru SHt'tT|c Elrverurt
'AtiRruo FArtunn tru MRmv Htmrtr LttrnRruRr
Edwin Wieringa
Mtsttutu Rruo lrs Applrcnrroru
ttrt ltrtoorurswN FlrwA
Khoiruddin Nasution
ssN 021 5.0492
STI]DIA ISTAilIIKA
Indonesian Journal for lslamic Studies
Volume 3, Number 4, 1996
EDITOR]AT BOARD:
Harun Nasution
Mastubu
M. Quraisb Sbibab
A. Aziz Dablan
M. Satria Effendi
Nabilab Lubis
M.YunanYusuf
Komaruddin Hidayat
M. Din Syarnsuddin
Muslim Nasution
Wabib Mu'tbi
EDITOR-IN.CHIEF:
Azyumardi Ana
EDITORS;
Saiful Mujani
Hendro Prasetyo
Joban H. Meuleman
Didin Syafruddin
Ali Munbanif
ASSISTANTS TO THE EDITOR:
Arief Subban
Oman Fatbunabrnan
Heni Nuroni
ENGLISH I-"ANGUAGE ADVISOR:
Juditb M. Dmt
ARABIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR:
Fued M. Fachruddin
COVER DESIGNER:
S. Prinka
sTUDtA ISLAMIIG 0SSN 0215.0492) is a iournal published quanerly by rhe Institut.Agama Islam
,Veged (IAIN, The State Institute for Islamic Studies) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. (STT DEPPEN
No. 129/SVDITJEN/PPG/STT[976) and sponsored by the Department of Religious Affairs of the
Republic of Indonesia. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to communi'
cate original researches and current issues on the subfect. This iournal warmly welcomes
contributions from scholars of related disciplines.
All articles published do not necessarily represent the views of the iournal, or other institutions to
which it is affiliated. They are solely the views of the authors.
Faisal Ismail
Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties
and for all Mass Orgarrrzations; an Account of
Muslims' Responses
Abstraksi: Salah satu kebijakz.n penting pemerintah Orde Baru dalant
proses modernisasi politik addldh ditetapkannya Pancasila sebagai satu-
satunyd asas bagi organisasi'organisasi sosial dan politik di Indonesia.
Kebijakzn yang ditetapkan pd.da 198 5 ini, rnuupakan aual dari pudarnya
basis legitimasi dari aspirasi politik kemasyarakatan ydng berorientasi
agdma. Meskipun pada akhirnya kebiiakan ini memperoleb sukses yang
I uar biasa, tidak berarti babaa umat beragama di Indonesia rnenerirnanya
tanpa rnenghadapi kemelut-kemelut yang serius. Hal itu setidaknya dapat
dilihat dzri reEon urnat beragama yan g dipaksa untuk me kkuk'an tin juan
ulang atas legirimasi keagamaan dalam kehidupan sosial dan politik.
Artikel berikut ini merupakan upaya sistematis untuk melibar
hubungan dntdra Islam dan modernisasi politik yang didasarkan atas
respon umat Islam Indonesia terhadap kebiiakan pemerintah Orde Baru
tentlng penetapan Pancasila sebagai sdtu'satunya asas bagi seluruh
o r gani s as i p o I i ti k dan s o si a I - kem asy ar akatan.
Secara umurn dapat dikatakan bahrtta sebagian besar urnat Islant
rnenerirna Pancasik sebagai satu-satunya asas bagi organisasi sosial'politik
dan kemasyarakatan. Tetapi, penerimaan itu berrtariasi pada tingkat
alasan dan pertimbangan politis yang ditekankannya.Sebagai contoh,
N ah d I atu I U lam a (N U ), s eb agai o r gan i s asi m as s a I s larn y an g p a lin g au a I
menerima asas Pancasila, kmma wawknya yang akornodatif dan fleksibe l,
mudah menerimakebijakan itu dengan alasan'alasan politis dan teologis.
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) juga memperlihatkan sikap yang
sam a. Tetapi Muh ammadty oh, Himpunan Mah asiswa I s lam (HMI) dan
beberapa tokoh Muslirn modernis, karena waak rnereka yang cenderun g
reaiaalis, kelihatan lebih lambat untuk rnenerimanya dengan kekha-
uatiran bahwa kebijakan itu merupaban dncd.trTdn terhadap idcologi Is-
I arn. Kar m a itu, pmc an tuman as as P an c asi la te I ah m en i m b ul kan ko nfl i k
religio-politik yang mendasar di kalangan umat Islam modernis,
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sementard. di kalangan umdt Islam tradisionalis hal itu kelihaun tidak
menimbulkan persoalan. Perpecahan di tubub HMI pada karena
perdebatan tentang otot tunggil Pancasik rnemperlihatkzn henyataan
itu.
Narnun demikian, kebijakan pemerinah untuh, berbadapan dengan
organisasi massa Iskrn merupakan eksperimen politik berani yangpernah
dilakukan Orde Baru. Sebingga tidak mengherankan bila sebagian besar
umat Islam, baik secara indioidu maupun organisasi, mmaruh kecurigaan
atas diberlakukznnya kebijakan asas tungal Pancasila itu. Bagi semua
tokob, organisasi, dan partai politik Islam yang dibicarakan di sini,
kecemasan terhadap berlangsungnyd proses sekularisasi pada basis
legitimasi kebidupan politik merupakan hal pokok.
Secara garis besar, kecemasan itu ditunjukkan dalam tiga hal pen tin g.
Pertarna, dengan diteapkannyd dsds tunggal Pancasila itu, pernerintah
rn en gdn ggdp b ahu a i a s e c ara i de o I o gi s be n ar. P e n de katan in i (yan g dap at
dilihat dari respon beberapatokoh Muslim modernis) jelas ada kaitannya
dengan updya pemerintah untuk mencampakkan aspirasi-aspirasi lain
ryn g mungkin berbeda. Misalnya aspirasi masyarakat yan g berbasis pada
ideologi agama Kedua, pemerinuh ingin diakui sebagai pemeintah yan g
rnempunyai kornitmen dengan sejarah perjuangan bangsa. Pendekatan
ini boleb jadi rn*upakan cerrninan dari berbagai macam latar belakang:
nasionalisme, ide tentang persdtudn bangsa, auu pernerintahan demoE-
ratis. Atas dasar itu, pemerinuh mengdnggdp bahuta seluruh organisasi
dnn par atai p o I i ti k y an g ti dak m en c an tum kan P anc asi I a s e b agai-as as ny a
akan din i lai s e b agai tidak n asi o n a lis. Ke tiga, pemerintah in gii p an c asi I a
diakui sebagai ideologi yang efektif, Dalam konteks ini, pernerintah
rnengdnggdp bahua Pancasila bisa rnenyeLesaikan segala konflik politik
dengan baik, Pendekaan yang pragmatis terhadap persoalan legitunasi
ini sangat berpengaruh, baik pada organisasi yaig bersifat keagamaan
maupun ydng bersifat sekuler, dalam membaua ormas-ormas Islam untuk
menerima Pancasila.
Dalarn haian itu, penerimazn Pancasila sebagai asas bagi bampir
seluruh organisasi maxa dan politik Islam menanrki berakhiinya pola,
sbtern dary ideghgi keagamaan Islam dalarn kehidupan potitik. Idiotogi
Islarn, tidak lagi diperkenankan menjadi landasin y)ng kuat ,rtik
memberikan legitimasi terbadap partai, organisasi, dan gerakan sosial-
po liti k Indo nesia kontem p orer.
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iong with the promotion of national stability and economic
development, the protection and fortification of Pancasila as
the basis and national ideology of the srate became the Indo-
nesian New Order governmenr's main priority. This policy seems ro
have been motivated by a number of factors. First, in the wake of the
suppression of the PKI coup d'etar arrempt in 7965, the governmenr
was wary of the party's re-emergence despite an official ban. The
government saw rhe recently-banned PKI (Parrai Komunis Indone-
sia 
- 
Indonesian Communist Party), with its millions of members, as
a latent danger that could consolidate itself and re-emerge to pose a
serious threat to the nationai ideology of Pancasila. As recentiy as
January 1995,Dr. Suhardiman, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Ad-
visory Board (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, DPA), warned Indo-
nesians of the possibility of the re-emergence of the PKI by saying
that; "The 30 years since the 1965 abortive Communisr coup arrempr
have provided enough rime for former members of the Indonesiin
Communist Party and their foilowers to re-establish their power."1
According to Suhardiman, the communisrs now employ a ne* tactic
by which "they will no longer build their base from the borrom,
through workers and farmers. Instead they will build it from the rop
through the bureaucracy, the technocracyand capitalism by supporr-
ing neo-fundamentalism, which has been widening the gap between
the rich and the poor."2 Furthermore, he warned people that in or-
der to achieve their goals, the Communists "wi11 make sure they have
political security in the form of protection from power-holders and
legality with which they declare themselves as rhe rrue adherers to
Pancasila."3
The second factor was the rising of Muslim fundamentalist move-
ments in various parts of the Muslim world in the 1920s, parricularly
Iran. Alarmed by the possible spread of sedition in Indonesia as a
result of the Iranian revolurion, the government moved to safeguard
Pancasila. The third factors prompting the government's conrinued
protection of Pancasila seems to have been the rise of Muslim "separar-
ist" and "fundamentalist" movements in the country. Admiral Sbedo-
mo, in his capacity as a Commander-in-Chief of the Restoration of
Security and Order, explained on behalf of the government, its poli-
cies regarding these "radical" groups to Muslim leaders such as Hamka
andE.Z. Muttaqien of the MUI (lr4ajelis Ulama Indonesia, Council
of Indonesian Ulama) and Chalid Mawardi and Nuddin Lubis of the
PPP (Partai Persaruan Pembangunan, United Deveiopment party),
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at a meeting in Jakarta in April 1981. Mohammad Natsir and Prof.
H.M. Rasiidi, as the leading rePresentatives of Muslims, also attended
rhe meeting. soedomo's explanation of the rise of these Muslim mili-
tant movements can be summarized as follows.a
One of these groups was Hasan di Tiro's seParatist movement
which emerged in Aceh in 1977, and tried to establish an indepen-
dent state called the "Free Acehnese State."15 There was also another
movement called the Komando Jihad (Holy Var Command) by the
military, which was led by H. Ismail Pronoto (known as Hispran)'
The Komando Jihad had been held responsible by the military as
having committed acts of violence and terror in many areas, such as
Bukittinggi, Padang and Medan; due to these actions, its ieader, Ismail
Pronoto, was arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to life imprison-
ment in 7979.6 Another splinter grouP was one led by Abdul Qadir
Diaelani, who iaunched an anti-government movement shortly be-
fore the 1978 MPR (lvlajelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Con-
sultative Assembly) sessions. Vigorously advocating what he called
"the Isiamic Revolutionary Struggle Pattern," Djaelani was arrested
and imprisoned for two and half years./ The longest lasting move-
ment was that led by Varman who, like Hispran, called his move-
ment the Komando Jihad. This movement, operating between 1978-
1980, murdered Parmanto (Vice-Rector of the State University of the
Eleventh of March of Surakarta) and Hasan Bauw, a student of the
IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, or State Institute of Islamic Stud-
ies) of Yogyakarta. It also stole millions of. rupiabs (Indonesian cur-
rency) from Yogyakarta IAIN government workers'salaries and gold
from W'est Java, killing two policemen in the Rajapolah Affair of
August 22, L980.8
Another rebellion was led by the Imran group, which attacked
the police office at Cicendo, Bandung, on March 11,7987, and then
hijacked a Garuda DC-9 flight fromJakarta, forcing it to land at Don
Muang Airport in Bangkok. Imran's movement was also named by
the military the "Indonesian Islamic Revolution Council," which
struggled to "overthrow the Soeharto regime and transform it into
an Isiamic rule."e Soedomo claimed to the Musiim leaders that the
government had confiscated a copy of a letter sent by Imran to
Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran, requesting his spiritual and material
support for the reaiization of the ideals of the "Indonesian Islamic
Revolution Counci|'10 This and all the other above-mentioned move-
ments were crushed by the armed forces. It would apPear that the
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rise of these Muslim splinter groups was a reaction to the government's
stern political policies. However, "the Islamic organizations did not
take any measures to articulate their political inreresrs."11
Soedomo, accompanied by the Minister of Religious Affairs
Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, said that the above meering was in-
tended to clarify issues relating ro rhese Muslim radical groups, and
to abolish mutual suspicion between the government and the Mus-
lims. According to Soedomo, this clarification had to be made since
the Muslims "suspected that the Komando Jihad case, plane hijack-
ing and other terrors [in the name of Islam] were in fact fabricated by
the government in attempt to push the Muslims into a corner."12
Soedomo, however, rejected this suspicion and once again explained
the government's attitude towards these groups saying that "we dis-
tinguish between religion as a divine doctrine and its followers who
have gone astray and committed violence which is contrary to both
religion and the law." lVithour menrioning their names, Soedomo
said that some of these Muslim splinter groups had as their long-term
political objective the establishmenr of an Islamic state like the Darui
islam (DI) of the 1950s.
Furthermore, without revealing its identity, he also warned that
he would not tolerate a foreign state's support for a certain Muslim
splinter group, support which, in his view, could be seen as interfer-
ence in Indonesia's domestic affairs.r Soedomo accepred the Muslim
leaders' suggestion nor ro use the term Komando Jihad anymore since
this could destroy the image of Islam as a whole. At the same meeting
the Muslim leaders also appealed to the governmenr nor ro suspecr
the majority of Muslims, since they had in fact supported the srare
and did not wanr to make any changes ro Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution.la In the words of Jusuf Hasjim, a leading figure of the
NU f.{ahdlatul Ulama, lit., the Revival of rhe Lllama, one of the
largest Muslim organizations), one fact that the government often
forgot was that in any community extremist movements always rep-
resent a minority, not the majority.15 Therefore, in his view, it was
inaccurate for the government to generalize and identify these Mus-
iim splinter group movements with the majority of Muslims, who
had been loyal to Pancasila both politically and ideologically.
It is necessary to discuss very briefly the issue of the Komando
Jihad, in as much as it {'as a crucial issue for Muslims at that time.
Muslims leaders frequently asked: Vho was behind the Komando
Jihad movement? ril/ho was its real sponsor? Some has asserted that
Studia Islanika, VoL 3, No. 4, 1996
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Lt. Gen. Ali Moertopo and his group were behind it. Vhen inter-
viewed by DavidJenkins concerning the issue, Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwo-
no, former head of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, or State
Intelligence Coordinating Body), explained that:
Ali Moertopo belongs to these groups. So, for instance, you talk about
Komando Jihad. It's not a new issue. From the beginning, he has held this
opinion. I had to stop that at the time. He was of the opinion that we must
create issues. He said "at one time we will have to use this" and so on. Let's
say it's always in his mind. I tried to stop him. But I can't stop that because
he's always going to the President. He has his own Opsus.r6
Based on an interview with Mohammad Natsir, David Jenkins
writes:
Many in Indonesia share this suspicion, and take the view that the
Komando Jihad was an operation mounted by Moertopo to discredit the
Muslims. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, a prominent Muslim
leader, claimed in 1978 that Ismail Pranoto, a Kornando Jihad leader who
was sentenced to life irnprisonment in September 1979, was " an agent ltrovo'
cateur rtrn by Ali Moertopo," People at the grass roots ievel were dissatisfied
with conditions, Natsir argued, and were easily led. Moertopo's agents had
planted rumors about the Commttnist comeback and had promised former
Darul Islam activists weapons to fight the leftist "threat." The leaders of the
Komando Jihad-Ateng Jailani, Abu Darda (a son of S. M. Kartosuwirio, the
original Danrl Islam leader), Danu Subroto,Za.irul Abidin, Isrnail Pranoto,
and Kadar Salihat-were former Darul Islam leaders who were "now in the
control of Ali Moertopo and his group.... From the start they got help frorn
the Ali Moertopo group, not frorn the military as a whole. That is his special
hobby. Even the West Java cornrnander, [May. Gen.] Hirnawan [Susanto]'
knows it is a fabrication, but no one can say it. He knows it. He was furious
that everything is blamed on [1West Java] as a center of the Darul Islam.rt
Futhermore, Jenkins also notes that during interviews a number
of army officers expressed opinions almost identical to Natsir's.18 Two
important members of the Moertopo group, namely Harry Tjan
Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi, corroborated that the Komando Jihad
leaders did indeed have links with Moertopo. However, according to
Silalahi and lVanandi, these Komando Jihad leaders "misused" this
link, with the consequence that people had come to wrongly suspect
him.le In this case, Jenkins notes that "many Indonesians, a number
of prominent military officers among them, find this "explanation'
unconvincing." Jenkins added that an army general even insisted that,
"It is a manufactured account."s
On the basis of Juwono's explanation and the corroboration from
a number of army officers as mentioned above, it is safe to say that,
Studi4 [slan;k4, Vo[ 3, No, 4, 1996
10 Faisal Ismail
to some extent, the Muslim allegations concerning the Komando Jihad
and Ali Moertopo's Opsus were not entirely wrong. Muslims ar rhar
time had the feeling that the main aim of the Moertopo Opsus was-
in addition to interfering in the internal affairs of the party and weak-
ening it-to cause Indonesians to identify klam with violence and
terrorism. Under such circumsrances Islam and the PPP would be-
come politically isolated. Or, to quote Indonesia: Muslims on Trial,
"In fact, the prime purpose of the Komando Jihad canard was to link
Muslim activism in the public mind with alleged rerrorist activiries
and to intimidate the Muslim community as a whole."21 \flhen our
on trial, some members of the so-called Komando Jihad "arguei in
vain that they had been working as inteliigence agenrs for Opsus or
Speciai Operations, the inteiligence ourfit under General Ali Moerto-
po, and vehemently denied the existence of Komando Jihad."r
The Muslims felt that the image of their religion was damaged by
the KomandoJihad movemenr at that rime. Now, this issue needs to
be investigated in more detail, especially since the demise of Ali
Moenopo, against whom Natsir and other Muslim leaders have made
allegations. By doing so, historical facts surrounding the Komando
Jihad issue can be disclosed clearly and become known ro succeeding
generations, objectively and fairly.
The Government's Motives in Applying Pancasila as the Sole
Foundation
In line with its continued prorecrion of Pancasila, as illustrated
above, in 7982 the governmenr began to speak of the importance of
the application of Pancasila as rhe sole foundation for all political
parties and mass organizations. The government's main *oii,r. *r,
to safeguard Pancasila as rhe state's national ideology, and to con-
tinue to socialize it within rhe life of the narion. In order to do this,
the government feh that there should be no other ideology to rival
Pancasila. The governmenr's position on Pancasila as the sole basis
was motivated by two factors. First, the government seemed ro have
learned from the experiences of the previous general election cam-
paigns in which physical clashes (often resulting in fatalities), par-
ticularly between Golkar (Golongan Karya, Funcrional Group,
Indonesia's ruling party) and PPP supporrers, had frequently occurred.
President Soeharto acknowledged that "rhere had been occasional
outbursts of violence in the run-up to the election." and that this
happened due to the fact that "ntt all contestants had accepred
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Pancasila as the single acceptable ideology to be upheld by all socio-
political groups."x
The confrontation between Golkar and the PPP was due to strong
religious and political sentiments which had colored their attempts
to draw wide support from the Muslims, who constitute a majority
in the country.It should be noted that there is no official prohibition
on raising religious issues during the election campaign. F{owever,
the use of religious issues in an excessive manner caused conflicts
between the two sides. Very often in previous election campaigns,
the PPP and the Golkar became involved in fierce "battles," armed
with QurAnic verses and hadith, whereas issues of economic develop-
ment and social reform tended to be ignored. Learning from these
facts, the government perceived religion to be a source of conflict
and therefore began to put forward the sole foundation policy.
The second factor promotingthe government to establish Pancasila
not only as the sole basis or ideology of the state, but also for all
political parties and mass organizations in the country was that'
ideologically, Pancasila would occupy a much stronger position in
the social and national life of Indonesians. This idea seems to have
been prompted by the fact that, as far as political Islam was con-
cerned , the PPP still maintained Islam as their basis in addition to
Pancasila. The PPP's use of this "double" basis was seen by the govern-
ment as proof that they were not totally committed to the national
ideology of Pancasila. In an attempt to abolish this "double" basis,
the government then came up with the idea of applying Pancasila as
the sole basis.
This issue was in fact raised by President Soeharto himself in his
welcoming speech to Rapim ABRI (Rapat Pimpinan ABRI, or Armed
Forces Commanders'Meeting) held in Pekanbaru, Sumatra, on March
27, D8A).II was emphasized once again when he delivered a speech
at the 28th anniversary celebration of the Kopassandha (Korps
Pasukan SandiYudha, or Army Para-commando Unit) at Cijantung,
Jakarta, on April 16, 1980. In both speeches the President referred to
the national consensus that had been reached by ABRI (Angkatan
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) and all
socio-political forces in 1968, by which all agreed to the idea of imple-
menting Pancasila as their sole basis. This national consensus had not
yet been fully carried out, said the President, since "there was stiii
one political party which added another principle to Pancasila."2+ In
the eyes of the President, the attitude of this party led to "a question
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mark."15
It was generally believed that the President was referring to the
PPP, since he connected his remarks to the PPP leaders'walk-out
from the 1978 MPR general session (in reaction to the legalization of
the P4 [Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Guidance
for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasilal) and also
from the 1980 DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Represen-
tative Council-Indonesian pariiament) session, when changes to the
general election law were to be legalized. In his first speech, which
David Jenkins has called "the $orm over Pekanbaru,'2u Soeharto called
for ABRI commanders to intensify their vigilance towards the PPP
leaders, and warned that:
As long as we have not yet succeeded in bringing them to their senses,
we must step up our vigilance, choose partners and friends who truly defend
Pancasila and have no doubts about it. We do not mean to be hostile to a
parry or group which does not yet tnrst Pancasila 100o/o, no, but we are
obliged to persuade them in such as way that all social and political forces
will base themselves on our national ideology, Pancasila, with no addition
wha$oever.27
The President's speech provoked strong reactions from various
Muslim leaders?8 and from some prominent retired military officers.
On April 18, 1980, Lt. Gen. (ret.) A.Y. Mokoginta-a North Sulawesi
Muslim who had served as chief of the Sumatra Command between
7964 and 1967-sent a nine-page letter to Gen. Muhammad Yusuf
expressing his concern about Soeharto's address in Pekanbaru. In a
tone similar to Mokoginta's, the FKS Purna Yudha (an association of
prominent retired army officers) sent a letter on May 2,7980 to the
new army Chief of Staff, Gen. Poniman. The letter was signed by Lt.
Gen. (ret.) H. R. Dharsono (former Commander-in-Chief of the Vest
Java based Siliwangi division of the army and former Secretary General
of ASEAN) and Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudirman (former Commander of the
East Java Brawijaya Division).P
In addition, on May 13, 1980, the Petition of Fifty Group pre-
sented a one-page "statement of concern" to the Indonesian parlia-
ment, claiming that President Soeharto had falsely interpreted Panca-
sila. It also accused the President of using Pancasila as a weapon to
attack his political rivals, whereas the founding fathers of the Repub-
lic had intended it simply as a tooi to unify the nation. The group
was concerned by the President's address, which invited ABRI to
choose partners according to the political will of those in power and
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to remain neutral towards all socio-political groups. The leading fig-
ures of this group were retired generals such as navy Lt. Gen. Ali
Sadikin (former Governor of the Special Region of Jakarta), Gen. A.
H. Nasution (former Chief of Staff of the armed forces and former
head of the MPRS) and Gen. Hugeng (former Chief of the Indone-
sian Police). Former leaders of Masyumi (Majelis Syura Muslimin
Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Deiiberation Council-a leading Mus-
lim party in the 50's) such as Muhammad Natsir, Sjafrudin
Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap, as well as Muslim activ-
ists and preachers like A.M. Fatwa joined this group.s Regardless of
their political purposes, the involvement of Muslim leaders and ac-
tivists in this movement contributed to the inharmonious relations
between the Muslims and the government.
The government's idea of implementing Pancasiia as the sole basis
for political parties was first put forward shortly after the 1982 elec-
tion. Prior to discussing this point however, it is necessary to con-
sider the L982 general election and its results, through which we can
see the development of the political power of the PPP. As in previ-
ous election campaigns, the 1982 campaign was colored by bitter ri-
vairies and often violent clashes between the supporters of the PPP
and those of Golkar. The newspaper Kompas reported at the time
that the supporters of the PPP and Golkar had clashed in various
areas, particularly in Jakarta and Yogyakarta where numerous people
were injured and a few killed. The most serious clash between the
two eccurred on March 18,1982 in Lapangan Banteng, Jakarta, where
Golkar held its campaign. The supporters of the PPP were reported
to have challenged Golkar, leading to the outbreak of a riot which
resulted in the arrest of a few hundred youths. The authorities con-
sidered abolishing all election rallies, and the Chief of Security, Ad-
miral Soedomo, instructed the security to shoot rioters on the spot.rl
In the meantime, religious issues became quite prominent during
the 1982 election campaign. Susumu Awanohara wrote at the time
that "perhaps more than in the past, religious and other primordial
symbols have come to the fore in electioneering, overshadowing other
poiitical issues which might have been usefully debated.r2 For ex-
ample, PPP leaders and spokesmen claimed that voting for their party
was tantamount to choosing Islam, while voting for other parties,
especially Golkar was un-Islamic. PPP leaders even stigmatized Golkar
as being similar to the Golkarr3 (Golongan Kuraisy, or Quraish group)
referring thereby to the tribe of Quraysh which opposed the Prophet
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Muhammad's efforts in spreading Islam. In response to these issues,
Amir Moertono, General Chairman of Golkar, stressed in his cam-
paign speech that the election was simply a political affairs, and not a
contest about religious loyalty.A As in previous general elections, in
the 1982 election the Golkar won the majority vote, receiving 62.34
percent of votes, with the PPP getting 27.78 percenr, and the PDI
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesian, Indonesian Democraric Party) 7.88
percent.
Based on these voring percenrages, Golkar obtained 246 seats (232
in 1977), the PPP 94 seats (99 in 1977) and the PDI 24 seats Q9 in
7977).35 This distribution indicares rhar the position of the PPP had
weakened (losing five seats) compared with the result of the previous
eiection, whereas Golkar performed better and therefore become
stronger, gaining fourteen seats in rhe 7982 election. Judging by these
results, the PPP had cleariy continued to suffer losses vis-a-vis Golkar
in the political arena. As for the PDI, its position, like that of the
PPP, had also continued to decline, as it lost five seats in the 1982
election. Both the PPP and the PDI, due to lack of funds, poor orga-
nization and the overall politicai sysrem prevaiiing in the counrry,
remind too weak to present a serious challenge to the government
and the military-supported Golkar in Indonesian politics.
The Implementation of Pancasila as the Sole Basis
Following their political defeat, the PPP and the PDI were shocked
by President Soeharto's proposal to apply Pancasila as the sole foun-
dation for all political parries. The government's idea of unifying the
basis of all political parties was first put forward by the President in
his state speech before the DPR session on August 76, 1982. Later,
this idea of the President's was incorporated into the MPR Enact-
ment No. II/7983; it being reasoned that, in order to maintain,
strengthen and implement Pancasila in the social and national life of
the nation, all political parties, as weli as Goikar, should make Panca-
sila their soie foundation. Vith this enactmenr, the government abol-
ished the special basis and distinct characteristics upon which the
PPP and the PDI were based. In the case of the PPP this was "Islam",
whereas for the PDI it was "Indonesian Demo cracy,Indonesian Na-
tionalism and Social Jusrice". This process was part of the
government's poiicy to estabiish political stability and to wipe out
sharp politi cal polarization, which was believed to be caused by fanati-
cism, as seen in particular during previous election campaigns. This
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political polarization, coupled with religious fanaticism, frequently
resulted in hostility on the part of the political party towards other
political groups of different basis.% By applying Pancasiia as the
sole basis for all political parties, the government believed that
ideological antagonism among socio-political forces would be
eliminated,rz and that under such conditions it could concentrate
its full attention and energy on carrying out its national develop-
ment programs.38
The government's intention to stipulate Pancasila as the sole basis
for all political parties provoked reactions from various quarters in
Indonesian society. One group which included many civil servants,
agreed with the government, arguing that the stipulation of Pancasila
as the sole basis would reduce political tensions among the people
which in turn would strengthen national unity and facilitate the imple-
mentation of the nationai development program. Moeljanto Tjokro-
winoto, for example, argued that this idea would fortify the position
of Pancasila as a value system and as a cohesive force enabling Indo-
nesians to overcome socio-political conflicts.re In support of their
argument, this group pointed out how, in the 1950s, liberal demo-
cratic values and the multi-party system that they had generated, con-
tributed to the nation being torn apart by ideological strife. They
very existence of the nation was threatened by political conflict, par-
ticularly between the Secular Nationalists and the Muslim Nationai-
ists. Under such circumstances, opposing sides were constantly being
drawn into political battles which made it difficult to achieve politi-
caI consensus.
While the government and its supporters have frequently "cursed'
liberal democracy as a source of political and disorder, Abdurrahman
Vahid in his article "Pancasila dan Liberalisme (Pancasila and Liber-
alism), asked which aspects of liberal democracy can be accepted and
which refected on the basis of Pancasila. Wahid notes that people's
opinions, which differed from the government's, especially at the
grass roots level, were always regarded as being in opposition to gov-
ernment policies. According to 'Wahid, this attitude in fact "kiiled"
democratic impulses originating from Pancasila itself.s In this con-
nection, Herbert Feith also argues that the operation of liberal or
constitutionai democracy in Indonesia had, in fact, its own dynamics
characterized by, among other things, freedom ofexpression and free-
dom of the press. As he describes it:
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The operation of constitutional democracy in the period of the first four
cabinets was reasonably effective. Cabinets were accountable to the parlia-
ment of the day for many of their actions, although this was not an elected
body. The press was exceedingly free. Courts operated with considerable
independence from the government_, Demands for national loyalqv were rareiy
used to silence the critics of cabinets. And non-political administration char-
acterized at least some major parts of the government apparatus.*t
Furthermore, according to the government and its supporters, the
application of Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties would
encourage every party to become "more program oriented" rather
than "ideology oriented." In this way, a party's appeal would lie spe-
cifically in the quality of the programs it offered to people, not in the
ideological basis it used. Thus, the major issues during an election
campaign would center mainly on programs rather than ideology.in
this light, it was believed that ideology would not become a source of
political violence among parties, as had occurred during the previous
election campaigns.a2
Strong disagreement with the government proposal came from
the'Working Group of the Petition of Fifty Group which, in its state-
ment on September 23,1982, accused the government of being unfair
and mostly concerned with defending the political and economic
interests of those in power. This group said that:
the unification of the basis of various [political] groups existing in Indone-
sian society, with fabricated reasons, was intended [by the government] to pro-
tect the interests of the ruling class, i.e., to defend their political power and
economic interess which were not based on the historicai i'Ceals of the nation.a3
Furthermore, A. Rahman Tollengwarnedthe government to avoid
the tendency to reguiate and unify all sectors of social life, since this
would result in a populace which "idolized the state." Tolleng urged
that this tendency be curbed since it was against the basic nature of
Pancasila. As he puts it:
... it shoultl be acknowledged that the implernentation of Pancasila in
the life of the state was not without problems. As a [new] state which was rn
tire process of searching for its own form, [the Indonesian government] could
{all into a tendencv to regulate and unify all sectors of social life. This would
rnake the position of the state too strong vis-i-vis the fruled] peopie, and
would create what could be called "the idolization of the state." This ten-
dency needed to be curbed since this was against rhe essence of Pancasila as a
dernocratic ideology which respects human digniry. In this regard, I was of the
opinion that the only obiective way to curb this tendency was to establish
independent social forces to counterbalance the state and iu apparatus' force.{
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In spite these reactions, the government persisted in carrying out
its plan to implement Pancasila as the sole basis for all political par-
ties. On February lg,Ig85,the government, with the DPR's approval,
issued Law no. 3.1985, stipulating that all political parties and Golkar
adopt Pancasila as their sole basis. (This law was intended to amend
Law No. 3/1975, issued on August 27,7g7S,according to Article 2 of
which, the political parties and Golkar were srill allowed to maintain
their specific bases in addition to Pancasila). The law stipulated that,
within one year of its promulgation, both the PPP and the PDI, in
addition to Golkar, had to conform to this new regulation. Accord-
ing to the law, the President, with his authority, could freeze the
central boards of these political parties if they did not obey the law.
It is notable that the government policy of stipulating Pancasila as
the sole basis of political Parties and did not Pose any problem for
Golkar, as it was the government party and thus had Pancasila as a
part of irs raison d'6tre. This meant that only the PPP and the PDI
had to redefine their identities in response to the government policy.
The PDI, for its part, would not have any difficulty in adopting
Pancasila as its sole basis since its current basis was "secuiar", not
religious, in nature. However, as far as the PPP was concerned, the
new law was a sensitive issue since the party would have to remove
any mention of Islam as its basis, and adopt Pancasila in its stead.
Four months later, on June t7, 7985, the government, again with
the DPR's approval, issued Law No. 8/1985 on mass organizations,
stipulating that all social or mass organizations had to subscribe to
Pancasila as their sole bases. According to article 1 of the law, a mass
organization is an organization established by a group of Indonesian
citizens motivated by same aspirations, profession, ideals, religious
interests, or belief in God, with the objective of pursuing certain
goals within the state of the Republic of Indonesia. Vith the issuance
of Laws numbered 3/1985 and 8/1985, the adoption of Pancasila as
the sole basis of all poiitical parties and all mass organizations be-
came an absolute requirement and beyond further debate' This meant
that any rejection of Pancasila as its basis by any poliricai party or
mass organizationwould result in its dissolution by the government.
'We shall see in the following section how the PPP and various Is-
lamic mass organizations, as well as individual Muslims, responded
to the policies which, like earlier ones, touched upon their religious
sensibilities.
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Muslim Responses
Reactions of Indioidual Muslims
Reaction to the governmenr's policy to apply Pancasila as the sole
basis for all political parties came from many individual Muslims,
such as Fachry Ali (b. 7954), Deliar Noer and Sjafruddin Prawirane-
gara. Fachry Ali maintained that religion had played a pivotai role in
the development of political parties, particularly Islamic parties, from
their early history ro rhe presenr. He saw the government's policy of
stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis of organizations in the counrry
as the greatest political experiment ever conducted.+5 With this new
policy, all political parties had to re-wrire their constirurions, re-es-
tablish their political orientations and re-formulate their programs
in order to adjust ro rhe new political situation. All rhis, according
to Ali, would confuse their supporters, and in rurn make them less
loyal to their old leaders. Ali disagreed with the governmenr's opin-
ion and that of its supporters who said that religion was a source of
political conflict. He maintained that using this argumenr for the
unification of the basis of all political parries was fallacious. He ar-
gued that religion was nor a source of politicai antagonism, bur one
of unification in political life. As he said:
For Indonesia people, religion gives basic values [to tireir lives]. Parts of
[tireir] political actions are also ,justified on the basis of religic.rus reasons.
Besides, in the process of political development, religion always serves as a
rrnifying factor. This kind of situation continues ro exist in the PPp.s
In response to the government's proposal of Pancasiia as the sole
basis for politicai parries, Deliar Noer+/ traced the issue back to the
life of political parries under the Old Order regime. According ro
Noer, this regime tolerated any political party's special character-
istics or specific basis (as its raison d'6ve) in addition to Pancasila. In
other words, in this period a political party had own special basis,
serving as its own specific identity which differentiated it from other
parties. In the 1950s, for example, rhe Partai Katholik based itseif on
the principle of belief in "One God in general, Pancasila in particu-
lar, and action in accordance with Catholic doctrine. "The Parkindo
based itself on rhe principle of "Christia niry," whereas rhe NU-like
other Islamic parties-based itself on "Islam." As for the pNI, this
was based on rhe principle of Marhaenisme lProlerarianisml.as
Under guided Democracy, Soekarno stipulared rhar all political
parties utilize Pancasila as their "common" basis, but allowed them
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to maintain their special bases.ae Soekarno implemented this policy
with the intention that all the parties had to accept and defended
Pancasila. Noer maintained that Soekarno did not question this
"double" basis for the parties since, in line with his speech on Pancasila
on June 7, L9+5, he proposed only that it be used as the philosophical
basis for an independant state's philosophical basis. Flowever,
Soekarno allowed every political group to struggle for its own politi-
cal aspirations in the independence era in accordance with its specific
basis and goals.n
In keeping with his second principle, Soekarno urged all political
parties, including the Parkindo and Partai Katholik on the one hand,
and the Islamic Parties on the other, to struggle for their political
interests by obtaining as many seats as possible in the representative
body which would be established in the independence era.51 These
historical facts were put forward by Noer in an attempt to show that
parties based on religion, such as the Catholic, Christian and Islamic
parties, were encouraged by Soekarno to struggle for their own po-
litical goals in accordance with their religious aspirations. To empha-
size the importance of the specific basis of a p^rty, Noer aiso pointed
to the case of Muhammad Hatta, former vice-president and staunch
defender of Pancasila, who made great effons to found the PDII (Partai
Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party)
in 7967.In the new party's constitution, Islam and Pancasila were
designated equally as its basis. Islam's inclusion, according to Noer,
was intended to emphasize the importance of the party's specific iden-
tity, and to demonstrate that politics cannot be separated from reli-
gion in the teaching of Islam.s2
Deliar Noer disagreed with the government's and its supporters'
opinion that religion was a source of political conflict or violence
during the election campaigns. He argued that the main cause of the
conflict did not, in fact, originate from the religious basis of parties,
but from many other factors.In this respect, Noer pointed to the fact
that both during the 1955 general election campaign and the election
itself, in which a number of political parties with different ideological
bases competed with each other, a peaceful and tranquil situation
was maintained.53 The cause of the political violence during the elec-
tion campaign under the New Order should, according to Noer, be
sought in the government's handling of developments during the elec-
tion period. Thus, in Noer's opinion, the probiem was not as simple
as the government supposed.
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Noer explained that a single party system was in fact introduced
one or two months after Indonesian's independence, when President
Soekarno declared the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian
Nationalist Party) to be a single party. At that time all socio-political
forces opposed Soekarno's policy, and due to this opposition he al-
Iowed various groups of people to found political parties with differ-
ent bases.s V'hen Soekarno implemented his Guided Democracy,
the regime simplified the political system by allowing only ten politi-
cal parties to exist.55 lVhen, in 1973, the New Order launched into
political restructuring, this resulted in the amalgamation of all polit-
ical parties into three parties, namely the PPP, PDI and the govern-
ment backed Golkar. The government then issued Law No. 3/L975
on political parties and Golkar, which acknowledged and confirmed
only the existence of the PPP, PDI and Golkar, and did not allow the
creation of any other political parties. However, the iaw still allowed
the parties to use different bases, even though it encouraged them to
employ Pancasila as their common basis.
Noer argued that the government's idea of extending Pancasila to
serve as the sole basis for all political parries reflected a tendency to
narrow or restrict people's aspirations; a practice which should not
be carried out in democratic life.% Noer also saw this as a bid on the
part of government to implement a single parry system. Under such
circumstances, the existence of more than one party was simply a
formaiity. If this was ro be rhe case, Noer continued, the implemen-
tation of democracy in Indonesia should be debated: "Did we imple-
ment a democracy which gives us opportunities to freely develop
diverse ideas (with a sense of responsibility, of course), or did we
implement democracy just as a [ormality?"57
Despite the fact that the government did not clearly and openly
state the above tendency, Noer saw the implications of its policy as
appearing to point in this direction. Basically, the insistence upon a
sole basis for all political parties would allow for no fundamental
differences among the parties; rherefore, the implemenrarion of this
policy would in fact require no more than one political party.58 More-
over, Noer maintained that the use of Pancasila as the sole basis would
not enable the parties ro argue for the programs they wished to estab-
lish, since the values or criteria used to evaluate their programs were
the same. This would lead the parties to be less cotnperiri,r. in offer-
ing programs, which would make it impossible for them ro draw
wide support from the people. According ro Noer, the parties should
.Studia Islantika, Vol. .;, No. +, 1196
Pancasila as tbe Sole Basis 21
be allowed to maintain their special bases, since these would deter-
mine the platforms and goals which would make them distinct from
one another.5e
In Deliar Noer's opinion, President Soeharto's idea of employing
Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties would not only pose
trouble for the Islam-based party, the PPP, but would also cause prob-
lems for the ex-Parkindo and ex-Partai Katholik. \Vhen fused to be-
come the PDI in 1973, these two parties lost their special bases (Prot-
estantism and Catholicism respectively) and agreed to accept the PDI's
basis instead. According to Noer, their adoption of this new basis
was due to practical political considerations, not fundamental reli-
gious reasons. As far as the ex-Parkindo was concerned, Noer based
his assessment on one of the decisions of the National Conference on
Church and Society, which was sponsored by the Association of In-
donesian Churches and held in Salatiga, Central Java, on June 19-29,
7967. This decision stated that "the Christian faith does not accept
the view stating that Pancasila is the source of ali legal sources." An-
other Conference resolution, it is true, admits that Pancasila consti-
tutes "a material source of Indonesian positive law." However, ac-
cording to another resolution, what serves as *a source of aii iegal
sources is nothing but the [\fill of] the One God whom we know in
Jesus Christ. He is also the source of Pancasila."6 As far as the Partai
Katholik was concerned, Deliar Noer pointed to the existence of the
Vatican State which, in his opinion, reflects a view or faith which
does not separate religion (Catholicism) from politics.In Noer opin-
ion, the Pope is a symbol of the unity of religion and politics. On the
basis of these arguments, Noer concluded that, from a theological
point of view, the willingness of the ex-Parkindo and ex-Partai Kath-
olik to accept Pancasila as their sole basis did not solve the real prob-
lem, and only served the purpose of practical politics.t'1
Deliar Noer went on to say that if Muslims for their part accepted
the government's idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all political
parties, this would pose a heavy burden on their religious conscience.
It would foster dishonesty among Muslims and give rise to poiitical
hypocrisy in the face of policies launched by the government. The
Muslims, he said, would say "yes" to such policies, but it was not
certain that they would implement them.62 In his opinion, if the PPP
accepted the government's idea of Pancasila as the basis for all politi-
cal parties, the implication would be that the party acknowledged
the following:
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1. Religion and politics are separate within Islam. Thus, this [kind of
acknowledgement] would place Islam in a position equal to that
of other religion in relation to politics.
2. Religion, particularly Islam, is not in agreement with the demands
of the era, at least in the political sphere.
3. Islam has been a source of trouble [for Pancasila] in the past; or ir
was in contradiction to or, at least, not in accordance with Pancasila
in the field of politics.
4. Political disturbances during the last election campaigns were
caused by the PPP which still maintained its special basis (Islam)
in addition to Pancasila.d
In addition, Deliar Noer mentioned six political implications of
the application Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties. First, a
single basis for all political parties would deny the diversity of soci-
ety which flourishes in accordance with its convictions. Some of these
convictions may originate from reiigious doctrine. Second, a single
basis for all political parties would prevent groups of people who are
deeply rooted in the same traditions from unifying and exchanging
ideas based on their beliefs (including religious beliefs). In this case,
the single basis contained elements of force, not freedom, which con-
stitutes a basic characteristic of democracy. Third, a single basis for
all political parties would deny the relationship between religion and
politics. This, notably for Islam, was conrrary to its doctrine. As a
result, this would lead the parries into a process of secularization.
Fourth, making Pancasila the sole basis for ali political parties ig-
nored real issues which needed to be specifically formulated by the
parties when establishing their programs. This may occur because
their special bases, which served as the criteria needed ro assess rheir
own programs, were not allowed to be explicitly and clearly included
in their contributions. Thiswould lead the parties to be close-minded
in advancing arguments and to be hypocritical in expressing political
attitudes. Fifth, a single basis for all political parties reflected a ten-
dency to implement a single parry system. In spite of the fact that this
single party system would nor be formally realized, it could be said
that the multi-party sysrem was in fact abolished; the multi-party
system would exist in the name only. Thus, this system implied the
implementation of a single parry sysrem in a disguised form. Sixth,
Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties would block groups
of people from developing their convictions, mainly religious, which
in fact strengthened Pancasila. Consequently, people would be re-
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stricted due to a lack of alternative ideas which might be very useful
in the development of the state.&
In Deliar Noer's opinion, the New Order's policy of applying
Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties was not in line with
the ideals of the Indonesian leaders ol1945. As mentioned above, the
latter used Pancasila as the basis of the state and allowed any political
party to maintain its special basis in addition to Pancasila. Noer was
of the opinion that the application of Pancasila as the sole basis would
have more disadvantages than advantages.65 \ilhy? Because this policy,
according to Noer, implied-in addition to those points mentioned
above-the following:
1. That Pancasila as the sole basis was an absolute right, whereas the
absolute right lies with God.
2. The other bases were contrary to this sole basis, whereas it was
believed that religion was in accordance with it.
3. That openness decreased because assessments of a problem were
not automatically founded on this sole basis.
4. That peopie were hypocrites in poiitical terms.
5. That a singie and uniform interpretation of this sole basis had
been established, whereas different interpretations of it did not
automatically mean rejecting it.6
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the former Masyumi leader and former
president of the PDRI (Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, or
Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia),d also reacted
to the government poiicy of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis for
all political parties. On July 7,1983, he bravely sent a long letterd to
President Soeharto, appealing to him to stop his policy. He sent cop-
ies of his ietter to the Vice-President and the Justice of the Supreme
Court, and to the President, Vice-President and members of the Su-
preme Advisory Council.6e
Prawiranegara bdlieved that Pancasila was simply intended by the
founding fathers of the Republic to be used as the philosophical basis
and national ideology of the state, and not as the sole foundation for
all political parties and mass organizations. He firmiy criticized the
President's policy as being wrong and baseless and, for this very rea-
son, urged him to change his mind and discontinue his policy. "It is
better to run back halfway than to err the whole waf ," he wrote./oIn
a strong emotionai reaction, coupled with a feeling of frustration and
anger, Prawiranegara asked:
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\Vhy musr the Islamic basis of the remaining Islamic political party, Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), be replaced by Pancasila? After all, the Is-
lamic basis of the Islamic political parties and social organizations has long
existed and been recognized as not in conflict, but rather in accord, with the
1945 Constitution. \Vhy only now has the Islamic foundation to be replaced
by Pancasila? What crime has the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or the
HMI [Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam 
- 
Islamic Association of Universiry Stu-
dents], or many Muslim organization committed?7l
Tbe PPP's Response
The PPP is a fusion of four Islamic political parties, namely the
NU, PStr (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union
Pany), Perti persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah,Islamic Education Union)
and Parmusi (Partai Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party).
Prior to the fusion, the NU was the largest party of the four, drawing
its main support from rural Muslims. This can be seen, for example,
from the results of the 1977 general election in which the NU won
18.69 percent of the vote (58 seats), whereas the Parmusi took only
5.36 percent (24 seats), the PSII 2.39 percent (10 seats), and the Perti
0.70 percent (2 seats)./z On January 5,1973, in the wake of the New
Order's policy of political restructuring, these for Islamic parties
merged into a single party called the PPP, with the main objective of
advancing Islamic political aspirations. The PPP, especially in its early
development, often experienced political turmoil because certain el-
ements within it, chiefly the NU and the MI (Muslimin Indonesia, or
Indonesian Muslims), pursued their own political aspirations. At the
same time, the government often interfered in the internal affairs of
the party, supporting the leadership of those who were pro-govern-
ment and pushing the non-accommodationists (particularly member
of NU) out of the party. The political rurmoil within the PPP, coupled
with the government's intervention, resulted, for example, in the res-
ignation of K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leading figure of the NU, from
the PPP leadership.T3
During this period, many members of the NU faction within the
PPP were known as hard-liners who opposed several of the
government's policies. Consequently, despite its majority position
in the PPP, not one of the NU leaders ever became general chairman
of the executive council of the party. This happened because the gov-
ernment prevented the NU ieaders from holding this position, fear-
ing that the party would be mobilized to pose a challenge ro rhe
government. The only senior and "strategic" position given to the
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NU was chairmanship of the consultative or advisory councils of the
PPP. Vhile the position of the NU element within the PPP contin-
ued to be weak, that of the Mi element became stronger as indicated
by the fact that the chairmanship of the executive council of the PPP
was always in its hands. Under the leadership of Jaelani Naro, a
Parmusi activist who was supported by the goyernment, the position
of the NU element within the PPP continued to weaken./a However,
when kmail Hasan Metareum (a Parmusi figure who had a moderate
attitude) became the General Chairman of the PPP in 1989, the posi-
tion of the NU element was slightly improved, as can be seen from
the fact that the position of Secretary General of the party was given
to Mathori Abdul Djalil, an NU man.
Before the government's application of Pancasila as the sole basis
for all political parties, the PPP, as an Islamic party, used the symbol
of the ka'bah (cubicle building in the Haram mosque of Mecca to-
ward which Muslims direct their faces in salah or prayers) which
attracted Muslims to vote for it in general elections. The use of the
symbol was proposed by K. H. Bisri Sansuri, a leading 'Alirn of rhe
NU who also served as chairman of the consultative council of the
PPP. It was reported that prior to arriving at his proposal, Bisri had
performed shAlah istikhArah (a night prayer seeking direct guidance
and blessing from God), during which he had received a vision that
the symbol of the ka'bah was suitable to be used as an emblem by the
PPP. Thus, the PPP activists became convinced that their struggle
for the party would be blessed by God./5 Similarly, because the ideo-
logical basis of the PPP was both islam and Pancasila, this meant that
it struggled for Islamic political aspirations within the context of
Pancasila. In the PPP's view, these two principles did not contradict
each other.
According to its 1973 constitution, "the PPP is based on Islam and
aims at guiding the state of the Repubiic of Indonesia on the founda-
tion of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, leading to the establish-
ment of a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty."e
To achieve this goal, the PPP made every effort
(1) to implement Islamic teaching in the life of individuals and the com-
munity in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution;
(2)to develop Muslim brotherhood within the context of national
unity and integrity; and
(3) to stimulate the creation of a good atmosphere in which religious
activities, according to Sunnism, could be carried out.7z
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Also according to its constitution, the PPP based its programs
upon rhe basic principle of "enjoying the good and prohibiting the
e'rril," and impiemented these Programs with the obiective of:
1. building an Indonesian society obedient to God Almighty;
2. establishing noble moral conducr within Indonesian society by
eievating its religious consciousness and responsibility;
3. defending and building rhe state of the Republic of Indonesia based
on pancalila, leading ro rhe crearion of a jusr and prosperous soci-
ety blessed by God the Almighty; and
4. stiuggling to develop economic life based on the principle of fam-
ily spirit.z8
In !977, four years after its foundation, the PPP modified its con-
stitution in which its basis was stated as, "the PPP is based on Pancasila,
the 1945 constitution and Islam." In line with this modification, the
PPP reformulated its goals, aiming at:
a. attaining rhe narion's ideais as laid down in the 1945 constitution
which are in agreement with those of Islamic teaching;
b. establishing a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Al-
mighty, spiritually and materially based on Pancasila and the 1945
Constiturion in the unitary state of Republic of Indonesia.Te
From the above questions, it is clear that these three important
elements, i.e., the basis, goal and program, were closely interrelated
and could not be separated from one another in the political struggle
of the pPP. Indeed, these rhree elemenrs gave a clear and specific
identity to the PPP as an Islamic partf ; and distinguished it from the
PDI and Golkar. In line with its religious and political goals, the PPP
exhibited a staunch and consistent attitude toward government poli-
cies which, in its view, were contrary to its principles. For example,
in 7973 it rejected the government's Proposal of the marriage bill
(which, in its view, was secular in nature) and walked out of the 1978
MpR general session held to discuss the legalization of the aLiran
kepercayaan (Javanese mysticism) and the P4.
The PPP did not react substantiaily to the government's proposai
ro stipulate Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties. It mostly
kept iilent in response to this very important issue. In fact, the PPP
faction in the DPR had participated in the discussion concerning the
government's proposal of Bill No. 3/1985 (in which Pancasila as the
sole basis was proposed) and, together with other factions, approved
it. With the government's issuance of the law, the PPP had no choice
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but to obey, meaning that it had to redefine its identity in accordance
with this new regulation. In resPonse to this law, J. Naro, General
Chairman of the PPP, quickly said that the PPP had implemented it
fully and completely.s However, Naro persisted in keeping the
Ka'bah as the symbol of the PPP, refusing to replace it with an-
other symbol for fear of losing the party's traditional supPorters.
This provoked disagreement with his colleague, Syarifuddin
Harahap, who accused him of going back to the spirit of the Jakarta
Charter.sl
In the meantime, Sulastomo expressed his surprise saying that "it
was unbelievable that they $'{aro's group) would change the basis of
party so easily, while persistently refusing to replace the election
symbol. The symbol was in fact a representation of the Islamic basis,
was it not?"e In a tone similar to Naro's, Sudardii stated that "we
should abandon all of these Iideologies other than Pancasila]."s Asked
whether Islam were a narrow ideology, he answered in the affirma-
tive.& Sudardji's attitude provoked criticism from Syafii Maarif (a
scholar who had graduated from the University of Chicago) saying
that "this is the way this PPP leader understands Isiam in its reiation
to politics. Indeed, many of the Muslim politicians have now iost
their dignity and self-respect."85 Maarif then added that,
Here, again, we observe a shameless example where many Muslim offi-
cial leaders have too easily becorne prey for the political game. Therefore, irr
view of this, a question may be raised: How can one exPect to be able build
a strong and attractive polidcal party on the foundation of self-serving and
irresponsible individuals? It appears to us that the Muslim "leaders" are still
not ciever enough to take a lesson from history. Even after a series of con-
tinuous disgraceful failures, these leaders remain incapable of benefiting frorn
their post experiences. Perhaps, to them it is enough to presert Islam by
. lneans of a number of slogans and generalities necessary for "buying" votes
frorn the urnmah in the elections.s6
it should be clear from these discussions that Muslim scholars like
Noer, Maarif and Fachry Ali, as well as Muslim leaders such as
Prawiranegara, felt free to express their objections to the government's
imposition of Pancasila as the sole basis for ail political parties. They
could do this because they were not PPP activists. They were Mus-
lim figures who were concerned with the "fate" of the PPP, and who
had the right to express their views on Islam and politics, particularly
in relation to the PPP and Pancasila as the sole basis. As for the PPP
leaders, they faced a political dilemma in the sense that their rejec-
tion of Pancasila as the soie basis would result in the partv's dissolu-
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tion by the government. In order to save the party, the PPP leaders
had to choose a pragmatic way to accept Pancasila as the sole basis of
this party.
In redefining its identity in conformity with the law, the PPP in
1985 reformulated its basis to read: "the PPP is based on Pancasila."
Vhile the PPP has permanently maintained Pancasila as its sole ba-
sis, it has changed its goals and programs in accordance with the po-
liticai demands that it has faced. In 1987 the party issued a new con-
stitution in which its political goals were formulated and designed:
1. to develop the spirit of brotherhood in all aspects of social and
religious activities with the aim of strengthening the national unity
and integrity of Indonesians;
2. to implement religious doctrine in the lives of individuals and the
community; and
3. to stimulate the creation of a good atmosphere for the implemen-
tation of legal religious pracrices.v
If we compare these reformulated goals with those laid down in
its 1983 constitution, we wiil note the following points: (1) the PPP
changed the expression "to develop Islamic brotherhood" in its 1983
constitution to become "to develop the spirit of brotherhood" in its
1987 constitution; (2) the PPP exchanged the formulation "to imple-
ment the teaching of hlam" in its 1983 constirution with "ro imple-
ment religious doctrine" in its 198/ constitution; and (3) the formula
"to carry out reiigious doctrine according to Sunnism" in its 1983
constitution was replaced by "to observe iegitimate religious prac-
tices" in its 1987 constitution. In keeping with the redefining of its
identity, the PPP replaced its symbol, the Ka'bah, with that of a srar.s
Thus, the PPP removed everything related to the use of an Islamic
basis, identity, formulas and symbols following its adoption of Panca-
sila as its sole basis.
Following these "radical" changes, Ridwan Saidi, a leading activ-
ist of the PPP, warned others nor to treat Islam as a "political com-
modity" or a "ticket which will bring them to Senayan"P (parlia-
ment). This clearly shows that Saidi rejected the idea of utilizing Is-
lam as a vehicle in the pursuit of political goals, arguing that Islam
should be sincerely implemented. "I do not wanr to throw away Is-
lam," he explained, "I just want the Islamic formulas of the party to
be removed so that the glory of Islam is not misused as a political
commodity."{ Saidi even mainrained that, with the implementation
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of the lax's on politics, all political parties were now considered
Pancasila parties in the sense that their ideology was Pancasiia. In his
view, PPP should be an open party which is also capable of attracting
non-Muslims. Saidi's view was supported by Kyai Haji Ahmad Siddiq,
a leading'Xlim in the NU circle, saying that, in the principal of open-
ness, the PPP should be open to both Catholics and PDI supPorters.
"The PPP," Siddiq said, "should not be a narrow-minded party."e1
Roeslan Abdulgani, one of the chief ideologues of the ex-PNI, shared
this view saying that,
By accepting Pancasila, the United Development Party may well lose its
Islamic character. ...But this sirnply rneans that the political aspirations of
Muslims can flow through whatever channel they wish. I too am a Muslim
... I used to express my political aspirations through the Indonesian Nation-
alist Party. ... Now I do so through Pancasila. ... The Darul l-slam frevolts]
have created a terrifying image of Islarn in Indonesia. The Muslim cornmu-
nity has to dispel this image. It is very rnuch to be hoped tirat the young
generation of Muslims will play its role in introducing new ideas about I-s-
1arn.e2
Commenting on the present position of the PPP, Rusli Karim (b.
1952) says that, in actual fact, the party v/as pushed into a political
corner (terjepit) since it was willing to remove the use of Islam as its
basis and then declared itseif a non-Islamic party. This, in Karim's
view, was strange and a-historical.er The idea of making the PPP an
open party, however, gradually disappeared, never to become a real-
ity.
With the adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis, the PPP was no
longer an Islamic party in the real sense. However, since the PPP is
an the amalgamation of the four Islamic parties (NU, Perti, Parmusi
and PSII), it continues to have a spiritual and emotional tie to Mus-
lims, from whom it has drawn its most substantial support. In the
!987 general election, which took place two years after the adoption
of Pancasila as its sole basis, the PPP obtained 18.8 percent of the
vote and received 61 seats (27.78 percent with 94 seats in 1982), whereas
Golkar obtained 74.8 percent (299 seats) and the PDI8.7 percent (40
seats).e+ This indicates that in the 1987 election, the PPP, without
having Islam as its basis, lost 33 seats, and became increasingly weak.
The decrease in the PPP's percentage of votes in the 1987 election
was caused, p^rtIy if not mainl y,by a political campaign launched by
many of the NU's leading figures who called for its members not to
vote for the PPP.% This campaign, known as "aksi penggernbosan"
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(puncturing the tires), was launched by many of the NU's leaders
because they were resentful of the MI element within the PPP
which was always upstaging the NU. Despite this internal con-
flict, the PPP in the 1988 MPR general session remained active in
voicing Islamic aspirations. For example, it put proPosals to the
MPR that:
1. the selection of the discussion on religion and that of the aliran
kepercayaan in the GBHN (Garis-garisBesar Haluan Negara, Board
Outiines of the Nation's Direction) be separated;
2. religious education, which has been provided at all state schools
at all levels, be provided at private schools as well;
3. the pesantren as an Islamic educational institution be incorpo-
rated into the GBHN; and
4. gambling in any form be abolished.%
As far as the first point was concerned, the PPP argued that the
essences of the two are totally different: the aLiran kepercayaan is a
culture, whereas religion is a divine revelation. In support of its argu-
ment, the PPP referred to articie 29 of the 1945 Constitution, and to
the 1983 GBHN enactment stating rhe aliran kepercayaan is not reli-
gion.e/ In the second proposal, the PPP argued that religious educa-
tion should be given to students in all schools, not only in state schools
but also in private ones. In the opinion of the PPP, the dichotomy
between the state and private schools lay only in administrative mat-
ters, not in teaching materials. In the meantime, the PPP saw pesantrens
as playing an important role in educating and enlightening the pub-
lic; therefore, they should be given a place in the GBHN. Finally, the
PPP saw the harmful impact of gambling on society, and proposed
that all forms should be abolished in order that social life be based on
moral and religious principles.%
In addition, the PPP also presented some important ideas for the
completion of the government's proposal of a bill for a national edu-
cational system when this bill was debated in the DPR in 1988. One
of the PPP's proposals that was accepted was that the formulation of
educational objectives use the additional word irnan (faith) along with
the word takua (religious devotion) previously mentioned in the bi11.
In the PPP's view, the emphasis on the principle of "faith" was sig-
nificant in establishing an educational objective which was not secu-
lar in nature. Also, supported by Golkar and the ABRI faction, the
PPP succeeded in promoting its proposal that religious courses should
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be given to students by teachers embracing the same religion as that
of the students.e
All this indicated that, following the PPP's adoption of Pancasila
as it sole basis, the partf t in fact, continued to advocate Islamic aspi-
rations which, of course, were place within the context of Pancasila
and the 1945 Constitution. Although the PPP has removed its Is-
lamic symbol, as well as the mention of its Islamic foundation and
formulas from its constitution, Islamic values, which have long been
integrated into the PPP, continue to be present. Also, its long spiri-
tual and historical ties with its Muslim suPPorters persist. It may be
correct to say that the PPP is now a Pancasila based party which
voices Muslim aspirations. Or, in Chalid Mawardi's words, "The PPP
is no longer an Islamic party, but a party for Muslims."lm
The Minister of Religious Affairs, H. Munawir Sjadzali,l0l argued
in 1992 that, with the acceptance by Muslims of Pancasila as the sole
basis in their social and national lives, the government has paid much
more attention to Muslim's interests and has been more successful in
developing their religious life.102 As he puts it:
In 1985, all socio-political institutions, including Muslim parties, ancl
social organizations agreed to accePt Pancasila as the sole basis in their social
and national lives. Vith this, Indonesian Muslims have given up the idea of
an Islamic state, and so eliminated the possibility of the birth of an Islamic
state in Indonesia. As a result, as we have seen, there has been a change in the
governrnent and the parliarnent have come to realize that Indonesian Mus-
iims, being the rnajoriqv of the population in this "Pancasila" state and in
line with the message of democracy, are entitled to more attention to their
interests, including their religious interests, without hindering the interests
of other religious groups. This explains why, in the last few years, the gov-
ernment has listened more attentively to the wishes of Indonesian Muslims.
This change of attitude on the part of the got ernment, the iegislative branch,
and society in general reminds me of the popular statement by Dr. Nurcholish
Madjid at the beginning oI t970 when he said: "Islarn, yes; Muslim party,
no."
I think we are of the opinion that the religious life of Muslims in Indone-
sia has developed much better at the time when Muslim parties are no longer
in existence. Obviously, in Pancasila state, as longer as we hold fast to the
rules of the game and intelligently utilize the mechanisrn of ciemocracy, Mus-
lirns political interests will be better served without having recourse to Mus-
lirn parties.lo3
Sjadzali goes on to warn Muslims to take a lesson from their Past and
realLze that they will achieve their political goals only if they struggle
constitutionally and in line with national aspirations. Any Muslim
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group which tries to struggle for its political aspirations through
unconstitutional or exclusive means will not only fail, but will also
cause Muslims as a whole, who constitute a majority in the country,
to pay dearly for this failure.ltr On the basis of this argument, Sjadzali
appeals to Muslims as a whole to "accept the state of the Republic of
Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila, as the final goal of our politi-
cal aspiration, not simply as an intermediate goal...."1os
Deliar Noer sharply attacks Sjadzali by saying that his views were
not fully objective since he, as Minister of Religious Affairs, had a
political mission to advocate for certain of the government's inrer-
ests.1% In Noer's assessment, Sjadzali's views did not reflect the ideas
of a scientist or intellectual, but rather those of a politician who had
become the spokesperson for the New Order and saw the regime
only in a positive light, not in its negative dimension. Noer assesses
Sjadzali's agreements as unbalanced, something that should be avoided
by a scholar. Vhile Noer agrees wirh Sjadzali with regard to rhe de-
velopment of Muslim religious life under the New Order, neverthe-
less, in contrast to Sjadzali, he points out several negative develop-
ments which, in his view, have become prevalent during the New
Order period such as corruption, neporism, rhe spread of conglom-
erates, a widening gap between "the haves" and "thg have-nots,'
Christianization, nativism, secularism, consumerism, crime and pros-
titution.107
Having applied Pancasila * rn.'r",. basis for all political parries,
next on the political agenda of the New Order was ro implement
Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. For this pur-
pose, in 1984 a mass organizations bill was prepared and submitted
by the government to the DPR for approval.1o8 The debate on the
bill in the DPR lasted for one and half months,l@ indicating that the
bili received a critical and comprehensive assessment from ali fac-
tions within the DPR, including the PPP and PDI. To deal with the
issue, a Special Committee and a Working Team were established to
which mass organization leaders gave input and suggestions to be
used in the completion of the bill. According to rhe "Invenrory List
of Problems" recorded by the Special Committee and Working Team,
there were 86 points relaring ro rhe rights of mass organizations, eight
of which were regarded as crucial and therefore provoked exrensive
debate.llo
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Objection not oniy came from the PPP and the PDI fractions in the
DPR, but also from various socio-religious organizations which were
concerned that the government, with this proposed bill, would inter-
fere in their internal affairs. The MA\VI Saajelis Agung Wali Gereja
Indonesia, or Supreme Council of lndonesian [Catholic]Churches) and
the DGI (Dewan Gerela Indonesia, or Council of Indonesian fProtes-
tantl Churches) for example, objected to the bill. Their leaders argued
that both the MAWI and DGI were not mass organizations, but institu-
tions which were parts of an international institution' For this very
reason, theysaid that the mass organizations bill could not be applied to
them.111 On the other hand, the Vorking Team argued that the MA\M
and DGI were mass organizations to which the bill also applied.112 Fi-
naliy, following the government promulgation of the mass organiza-
tions law, both the MA\0I and the DGI accepted Pancasila as their sole
basis in 1986. After adopting Pancasila as its sole basis, the DGI was
transformed into the PGI (Persekutuan Gereja-gerejalndonesia, or Aili-
ance of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches).
As far as Muslims were concerned, as eariy as 1982 they had be-
gun to express their reactions to the government's proposal of Pan-
casila as the soie basis for all mass organizations. Many Muslim mass
organizations at first objected to the government's idea for fear that
adopting Pancasila as their soie bases could mean that Pancasila would
replace Islam, or that Pancasila would be made equal to religion.lL' In
response to this objection, the government stated that Pancasila should
be understood as a single basis regulating the civic life of Indone-
sians.11+ In this case, President Soeharto guaranteed that "Pancasila
would not replace religion, and it was impossible for Pancasila to
replace religion. Pancasila would not be made equal to religion, and
it was impossible that religion would be made equal to Pancasila."115
Also, as in the case of other social groups, the Muslim objection to
Pancasila as the sole foundation was caused by afear that the govern-
ment would diminish the diversity flourishing in Indonesian society,
and that this would restrict their socio-religious activities. In response
to this objection, Dr. Suhardiman (a prominent member of the Golkar
faction and Chairman of the Special Committee) stated that,
the bill clitl not aim at diminishing the pluraliiy of Indonesian society
which was reflected in people's creativity and freedom. [It] did not restrict
freedom of association, but gave good order to all citizens in carrying out
their social responsibility to build a Pancasila society' Neither did the bill
deny freedom of movement to any mass organization.l16
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In a tone similar to Suhardiman's, the Minister of Home Affairs
Soepardjo Rustam said that "the bill should be seen as a simple and
easy issue. There was nothing complicated which would cause trouble
for any mass organizations.'117 Furthermore, he also asserted that it
was up to mass organizations to redefine themselves according to
this bill, and to intensify their roles and activities in line with their
distinctiveness in implementing their programs. Thus, the social po-
sition of mass organizations was to be the same as that of political
parties although the former were not affiliated with the latter. Ac-
cording to the spirit of the bill, Rustam continued, all mass organiza-
tions were free to implement their own roles.118 However, unlike the
PPP which unanimously accepted Pancasila as its sole basis, the Mus-
lim response to Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations
can be divided into two categories: a majority which accepted it, and
a minority which did not.
Tbe NU's Response
Established by a group of 'ulaml.' in Surabaya, East Java, on Janu-
ary 31,7926, the NU is known as the biggest socio-religious organi-
zation amongst the traditionalist Muslim groups.lle It draws support
chiefly from rural Javanese Muslims, and operates thousands of pesan-
trens throughout the country. According to its constitution, the ba-
sic principles of the religious ideology of the NU are as follows:
1. The NU bases its ideology on the sources of Islam doctrine: the
Qurln, hadith, ijmA', and qiyis;
2. In understanding and interpreting Islam from its sources, the NU
follows Sunnism and uses the following approaches: (a) the teach-
ings of Abri Hasan al-Ash'art and Abfi Mans'ir ai-Maturidi in the-
ology; (b) one of the fow madhAb: r.he Hanafi, the MXliki, the
Shefi'i, or the HanbXli madhhab in Islamic law; and (c) the teach-
ing of al-Junayd al-Baghdldi, and al-GhazXli and their like in mys-
ticism.l2o
V'hen the Masyumi was founded in November 7945 in Yogyakarta
to serve as the only Islamic partf t the NU joined it. However, due to
political conflicts that occurred between Nl-I and Masyumi leaders,
the former declared itself an independent political p^rty at its na-
tional congress of. t952 in Palembang, South Sumatra.121
Together with the PStr and Perti, the NU under Soekarno's Guided
Democracy vigorously struggled for Isiamic political aspirations.
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Critics often accused the NU of being opportunistic under Guided
Democracy since it showed its readiness to cooPerate with the PKI
and demonstrated accommodating attitudes toward the regime.
Others have, however argued that the NU in fact struggled from
within, facing the PKI directly in the political arena: sometimes it
showed a readiness to cooperate with the PKI, while at other times it
maintained distance ois)-vis the latter.12 Some said that it was not
fair to label the NU only as being opportunistic since the PSII and
Perti had done the same thing. The NU's political attitudes towards
the PKI became clear when the latter staged its revolt in 1965.It was
the NU which "first" demanded that the PKI be dissolved, and it was
also the NU, supported by its mass organizations such as the Banser
(Barisan Serba Guna, or Multi-use Front) and the Gerakan Pemuda
Ansor (Helpers Youth Movement), which made an important con-
tribution to the New Order forces in their destruction of the rebel-
lion.lx
In the early development of the New Order, the NU exhibited a
"radical" attitude towards the regime. Nakamura is correct when he
states that the NU in the 1970s emerged the boldest and most defiant
critic of the New Order government.l2a'When the NU, together with
the Parmusi, Perti and PSII, fused in 7973 into a single Islamic party
called the PPP, its critical attitude remained. It was the NU eiement
within the PPP which most strongly objected to the legalization of
both the P4 and the aliran h,epercayaan in the 1978 MPR general ses-
sion. The same attitude was taken by the NU when changes to the
election law were legalized by the DPR in 1980. In the 1977 election
campaign, K.H. Bisri Sansuri (a leading figure of the NU and chair-
man of the consultative council of the PPP) issued afatwA saying that
every Muslim was legally obliged to vote for the PPP. From this it
could be deduced that voting for Golkar, the government party, was
prohibited under Muslim law.
During this period, NU supporters within the PPP were known
as the so-called hard-liners and were disliked by the government re-
gime. In order to appease the latter, Naro, chairman of the executive
board of the PPP, began to "purge" the these hard-liners from the
p^rty. Vithout consulting any NU members, he presented on Octo-
ber 27,7987 a list of candidates for the 1982 election to the General
Election Committee in which he belittled and pushed our 29 promi-
nent figures (including the so-called hard-liners) of the NU. Among
those pushed aside by Naro were K.H. Masjkur, K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri,
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Rahmat Muljomiseno, Jusuf Hasjim, Chalik Ali, Imron Rosyadi,
Mahbub Djunaedi, Aminuddin Aziz, T . J afizham and Hasj im Latief.
In the light of its dissatisfaction with Naro's action, the NU element,
led by Jusuf Hasjim and his friends, submined another list of candi-
dates to the General Election Committee, but it was reiected. How-
ever, the Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Mahmud, unhesitatingly
accepted the first list as valid. As a result, these prominent leaders
and the so-called hard-liners of the NU were not elected as members
of the DPR/MPR.125
F{owever, the NU showed a cooperative attitude in response to
the government's idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass orga-
nizations. It may be that the NU wanted to abandon its confronta-
tional attitude towards the government, and make efforts to establish
better relations with it. In spite of the fact that the mass organiza-
tions law had not been officially promulgated by the government,
the NU expressed its agreement to accept Pancasila as its sole basis.
Later, this agreement was formalized by a decision made by the NU
at its 27rh National Congress heid on December 8-\2, 7984 at the
Salafiyah Syafiiyah Pesantren in Sukorejo, Situbondo, East Java. An-
other important decision made by the NU was its deciaration that it
would return to the spirit of !926, serving again as a socio-reiigious
organization, and abandon practical political and sever all links with
any political party.126
In iine with this decision, the NU reformulated its constitution to
read (in article 2) rhat it is "based on Pancasila." In keeping with its
character as an Islamic mass organization, the NU, in articie 3 of its
constitution, states that it "follows Islamic doctrine according to the
teaching of Sunnism (ahl sunnah ua al-jamh'ah) and follows one of
the four madhhab: the Hanafi, the Miliki, the ShXfi'i, or the Hanblli
rnadhbab. By stating its position in this way, the NU did not aban-
don its nature as an Islamic social movement, while clearly ac-
knowledging Pancasila as its sole basis. The way in which the NU
defined itself in relation to Pancasila as the sole basis became a "model"
which, as we shall see latter, was adopted by Islamic mass organiza-
tions. It is worth mentioning that the NU was known as the "first"
to accept Pancasila as its sole basis.lz
The decision taken at the 1984 National Congress was made easier
by the groundwork performed at a national meeting held one year
earlier in very same location. At this meeting a number of prominent
NU'ulamA', including K. H. Ahmad Siddiq, discussed the signifi-
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cance of the NU's rerurn ro rhe spirit of 1926 and also issued a decla-
ration on the relationship between Pancasila and Islam. This declara-
tion read:
1. Pancasila, as rhe basis and philosophy of the state of the Republic
of Indonesia is not a religion; neither can it replace religion nor be
used to replace the position of religion.
2. The prinJiple of "Belief in One God" as the foundation of the
nepu-blic of Indonesia, as stated in article 29 paragraph 1 of the
1g+5 constirurion which gives life to all other principles, reflects
"monotheism" (tauhtQ in accordance with the notion of belief
(imAn) in Islam.
3. For the NU, Islam, which teaches 'aqtdab and shari'ah encom-
passes aspecrs of the relationship of a human being with his/her
God and the interreiationship between human beings.
4. The acceprance and observance of Pancasila constitutes a reahza-
tion of Indonesian Muslims' aspirations ro carry out rheir shari'ah.
5. As a consequence of this creed, the NU has an obligation to main-
tain the true notion of Pancasila and its correct and consistent
observance by all.128
This declaration was used by the NU as a religious justification to
accept Pancasila as its sole foundation at the 1984 congress mentioned
abolre. Furthermore, the 'ulaml' of the NU said that the question of
pancasila had been finalized long ago when it v'as agreed on August
7g, 7945 that it be used as the basis and national ideology of the state.12e
In view of this, the NU called for all groups to maintain a correct and
consistent perception of Pancasila according to the form in which it
had been laid down in the 1945 Constitution. The NU's acceptance
of Pancasila as its sole basis also had a historical precedent in the fact
that K. H. Vahid Hasf im (I91'4-1953),1s a leading figure of the NU,
acrively participated in formulating Pancasila and the preamble of
the 1945 Constitution along with other Muslim nationalist leaders.
Because of this, its formulation was regarded by the NU as accept-
able to Muslims. similarly, in its view, Pancasila as the basis of the
state is nor conrrary ro rhe teachings of Islam, and should not be
opposed.lrl
- A number of NU 'ulamA' also advanced arguments in favor of
Pancasila which were based on traditional sources. Referring to the
Qur'An (silrah Aii 'Imrln: 64), K' H. Ahmad Siddiq,lr2 general chair-
men of rhe consultative council of the NU, viewed Pancasila as a
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kalirnatin sdlehin (an equatable proposition) which unified all seg-
ments of Indonesian society.ll An expert in Islamic iaw, in 198a Siddiq
made a legal analogy (qiyAs) stating Pancasila, which had been used as
the basis and national ideology of the state for forty years, was like a
fruit which was eaten everyday byMuslims. The question of whether
eating the fruit was lawful or unlawful for Muslims was strange and
illogical.ll Siddiq seemed to say that any Islamic mass organization
which questioned whether Pancasila was acceprable to be used as its
sole foundation was not only mistaken but irrelevant and a-histori-
cal. In this connection, he claimed that the acceptance of Pancasila
by Muslims as the sole basis in socio-political life was a legal obliga-
tion. Thus, other bases could not become alternatives or rivals to
Pancasila.lrs Siddiq even asserted that, for Muslims, the establishment
of Pancasila-base state of Indonesia was the final goal of their politi-
cal aspirations, not simply a transitional goal.Lt6 This meant that any
idea of establishing an Islamic srare cannot be considered part of
Muslim political aspirations, and any arrempr to do so by any Mus-
lim group would not represent the aspirations of the entire commu-
nity. In similar tone to Siddiq's, Abdurrahman Vahid,lrz General
Chairman of the Executive Councii of the NU, also said in 1993 that
religion could no longer quesrion the position and legality of
Pancasila.lr8 He argued that this view had become the final political
decision of the NU, which did not treat religion as a ideological tool,
but saw its political function as one which provided prosperiry to
people in a board sense, including religious freedom.lse
Siddiq's iegal reasoning was often referred to by the Minister of
Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, in his efforts ro convince Mus-
lim mass organizations ro accept Pancasila as their sole foundation.
In a similar tone to that of orher rop government officials, he tried to
convince Muslim mass organizations "the acceptance of Pancasila as
the sole basis does not diminish the integrity of Islamic belief."1{ He
was of the opinion that the idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for all
political parties and mass organizations was not intended by the gov-
ernment to replace religion, nor to make Pancasila equal to religion.lal
The government's only motivation was to finalize the question of
the sole foundation for polirical and sociai organizations before the
running of the state was transferred from the 1945 generation (which
was then in power) to the nexr generation. In this way, national cri-
ses which occurred in the past in relation ro rhe basis and ideology of
the state (Pancasila), such as rhe Gestapu/PKl affair and other occa-
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sions of political turmoil, would not be repeated.142
Munawir Sjadzali expressed his satisfaction that many Islamic mass
organizations had accepted Pancasila as their sole basis, and their de-
cision to accept it, in his opinion, was made consciously. As far as the
NU was concerned, he rejected the accusation that its acceptance of
Pancasila as its sole basis was simply political opportunism, and
claimed instead that it was based on a deep political and religious
consciousness. He then raised the question, "If there are many Mus-
lim groups which still object to Pancasila as the sole basis, who do
they represent)'14r Sjadzali seemed to be addressing this question to
Muslim individuals or minority groups as well as the PII (Pelajar Is-
lam Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Students) which, as we shall
see, firmly opposed Pancasila as the sole basis.
Tbe Response from tbe Mubammadiyab
The Muhammadiyah,14 founded by K. H. Ahmad Dahlanl+s (1368-
7923) on November t8,7912 in Yogyakarta, in known as the largest
socio-religious organization amongst the modernist Muslim groups.
In establishing the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan was inspired by the teach-
ings of the Qur'in, notably verses 104 and 105 of s0rah AIi 'Imrln:
And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and
enjoin what is right ancl forbid the wrong, and these it is that shall be suc-
cessful.
You are the best of the nations raised up for the benefit of rnen; yotl
enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and beiieve in Allih ...
The Muhammadiyah has traditionally been supported in particular
by members of the urban Muslim middle ciass, who work as traders,
businessmen, teachers, religious preachers, intellectuals, and as gov-
ernment employees. Stressing the importance of. ijtihhd, it claims that
it does not subscribe to any particular madhhab, but instead follows
the opinion of one or another when, according to investigation, it is
proved to be in agreement with or close to the basic spirit of the
Qur'Xn and Hadith.
Organizationally, the Muhammadiyah has no formal ties with any
political party established by modernist Muslim groups. Flowever, it
has had close relationship with the Masyumi in the past, and main-
tains a close link with the MI element within the PPP at present. In
fact, individually, many members of the Muhammadiyah were pre-
viousiy active in the MasJumi, and are currently involved, through the
MI element, in the PPP. Some leaders of Muhammadiyah took the ini-
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tiative in establishing the PPP in the late 1960s and became prominent
leaders in its early development. This close relationship was made
possible because of their similarity in religious outlook, which is
deeply rooted in what they claim to the ideas of Islamic modernism.
Influenced by the puritanical teaching of \ilahhAbism, the Muham-
madiyah is concerned with the purification of Islam by ridding it of
what is regarded as bid'ah (unwarranted religious innovation).1a5
Adopting AfghAni's and 'Abduh's ideas of Islamic modernism,r+7 the
Muhammadiyah has also been concerned with the reformation of
Islamic thought. According to Mukti 'Ali, the main goals of the
Muhammadiyah can be summarized as a call for:
(1) the purification of Indonesian Islam from corrupting influences
and practices;
(2)the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern
thought;
(3) the reformulation of Muslim education; and
(+) the defense of Islam against external influences and attacks.la8
As a Muslim modernist movement, the Muhammadiyah gives spe-
cial attention to reform, which from the outset it has made every
effort to achieve. "It is has carried on much of its work through aux-
iliary organizations such as youth and women's associations, clinics,
orphanages, and above all, a large school system which presented
academic subjects and taught Islam not merely by recital and exegesis
but also as a basic system of religious, ethical, and social beiiefs."lae
Many have said that the Muhammadiyah succeeded in moderniz-
ing Islamic thought in its early development, and in some later peri-
ods, by calling for its members to exercise irtihAd and independent
Islamic rational thinking. Recently however, some have criticized
the Muhammadiyah for not playing a role in the renewal of Islamic
thought. For example, Prof. Rasjidi (himself a respected scholar and
prominent figure in the Muhammadiyah circie) has complained that
"most Muhammadiyah leaders have become monuments,"lso due, per-
haps, to their concerns with running their institutions, without un-
dertaking serious reflection, rational contemplation and intellectuai
thinking in relation to scientific and religious matters.
In response to the government's proposal stipulating Pancasiia as
the sole basis for all mass'organizations, the Muhammadiyah took
calm and careful steps. At the very beginning, the Muhammadiyah-
like many other mass organizations-believed that the principle of
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Pancasila as the sole basis stated in the 1983 GBHN enactment was
intended by the government to be used only by all political parties.
After consulting with the President, the Junior Minister of Youth
and Sport Affairs, Abdul Gafur, on August 30, 1982, clarified that
this policy also applied to all mas organizations, without exception.lsr
He also said that for this purpose the government, after gaining the
DPR's approval, would establish a law stipulating that all mass orga-
nizations must subscribe to Pancasila as their sole foundation. De-
spite the government's clarification, there was still much confusion
over the issue, resulting in different opinions or interpretations of
the 1983 GBHN enactment regarding the matter. For example, F{ardi,
former Vice-Prime Minister and Chief of the ex-PNI, was of the opin-
ion that, based on a correct interpretation ofthe contents ofthe 1983
GBHN enactment, the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis did
not apply to mass organizations, but only to political parties and
Golkar.ls2 In fact, it is true that no clear mention was made in the
1983 GBHN enactment that the adoption of Pancasila foundation
should also apply to all mass organizations. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara
reacted to this move by the government by saying that the law could
be easily produced since "the Peoples'Representative Council more
often express 'His Master's Voice' [sic] than giving voice to its feel-
' tt1<tlngs. '-'
Before moving on to discuss the Muhammadiyah responses to the
government's plan applying Pancasila as the sole basis, it is first nec-
essary to recognize the very strong position of the Indonesian politi-
cal system. The 1945 Constitution does not foilowJ. J. Monstesquieu's
theory of. trias politica which divides powers between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government, through which
"checks and balances" can be maintained. Instead, the 1945 Constitu-
tion distributes powers between different but cooperative organs of
government which individually or collectively serve national inter-
ests. In practice, however, much of the power is in hands of the presi-
dent.ls This situation allows him to "act beyond his capacity as the
head of the executive branch of the government.l55 In such a political
culture, any proposal or policy from the president (including his idea
of Pancasila as the sole basis) will readily receive approval from the
DPR because this body (and the MPR), according to Amien Rais, a
leader of the Muhammadiyah, is in fact the president's institution,
since its members are screened by the government and must be ap-
proved by the president.ls6 In other words, as critics point out, it is
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clear that the DPR and the MPR have functioned as a "rubber
Stamp"157 to legitimate the president's political culture. As Adnan
Buyung Nasution has noted, according to the Constitutio n of. 1945,
the People's Consultative Assembly has the greatest power. It also
elects the president for a period of five years, and in theory it can
recall the president. However, in practice approximately 60 percent
of members of the People's Consultative Assembly are appointed by
the president, while only 40 percent are elected through a general
election.158 In all general elections to date the Government party,
Golkar, has obtained about 70 percent of the vote. Although every
five years there is a ritual of presenting a report by the president to
the newly elected and appointed People's Consultative Assembly, it
is obvious that the public accountability of President Soeharto is as
ineffective as was that of President Soekarno during the era of Guided
Democracy. His frequently used rirle Mandataris (ptroxy) of the
People's Consultative Assembly denotes his unlimited authority rather
than his subordination to the People's Consultative Assembly. Presi-
dent Soeharto's continuous augmentation of power beyond any con-
stitutional limit is due the absence of any significant countervailing
power.15e
Having made this assessment, Nasution stated that President
Soeharto's continuous augmentation of power beyond any constitu-
tional limit is based on the concept of the family state and supported
by the Javanese aristocratic philosophy of the monarch.16 He based
his opinion on Soemarsaid's book, which describes 1[s gengs^t ^r
power of the old Javanese kings:
The [ideal] king's power was unlimited. He could not be regulatecl by
woritlly means, but within himself there was a force reflecting, or higher sdll,
identical with the Sori (Hyang Sukma Kauehas), which checked his inclividual
will. Divine Guidance expressed itself in the kcuitjalewrwan (wisdorn) of the
king ... which not only endowed [him] with the widest possible range of knowl-
edge but also the awareness of realities and a sense of justice.16r
On the other hand, President Soeharto has argued that he has done
his best to execute policies and actions (of course, including his policy
of stipulating Pancasila at the sole foundation) which are in the best
interests of his nation as a while. The president has like firmly stated
that he has carried out the will of the people, as expressed to him
through their representatives in the MPR and the DPR, after seeking
God's guidance, to the best of his'ability. As he said:
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Thank God, until now I have not failed in fulfilling my duty'.. I have
never felt that I have committed a failure... What has been assigned to me, I
have executed as best as I can, praying to God for guidance and direction.
Concerning faults, I think: "Who will measure them? Vho is to blame
me? For instance, I have done my duty, it is going well and succeeds accord-
ing to my criteria. If there are other people who see the resulm of my works
from a different angle, and then blame me or consider them a failure, I will
say: "That is their business." I do believe that what I have done, after I prayed
to God for His guidance and direction, is the result of the guidance of God.tu'
The government's idea of stipulating Pancasila as the sole basis
prompted the Muhammadiyah to hold a tdnrair session (it second
highest legislative forum after the congress) in May 1983, which passed
three resolutions:
First, the Muhammadiyah agreed to include Pancasila in its constitu-
tion, without changing the presently existing Islamic basis.
Second, since the problem of Pancasila as the sole basis was a national prob-
lern for the Muhammadiyah, it was to be faced by its cenual board on a na-
tional scale; there{ore, those on the regional boards and below were not al-
lowed to express any opinion or adopt any attitude relating to this problern.
Third, the discussion of the matter would be held at the corning 41st
national congress.r6r
Not ail Muhammadiyah figures demonstrated the same attitude in re-
sponse to the issue of Pancasiia as the sole basis for all mass organiza-
tions. Some hardliners within the Muhammadiyah circulated pamphlets
objecting to the sole basis plan on the grounds that it would pose a
threat to Islam. Among the Muhammadiyah hard-liners was Malik
Ahmad, Vice-Chairman of the organization and well-known scholar
from \Vest Sumatra, who "was prepared at one point accept the dis-
banding of Muhammadiyah"ls by the government. In addition, "one
Muhammadiyah leader from that part of the country fVest Sumatra]
was forced to resign after he bowed to pressure from local officials and
declared his acquiescence to the azas tungal (sole foundation] policy.165
Vhile the mass organizations bill was being discussed in the DPR,
the Muhammadiyah was active in providing input and suggestions
which it hoped would be included in the bill. In the meantime, the
leaders of the central board of the Muhammadiyah consulted and
exchanged views with the ABRI faction, some Ministers (for example,
the Ministers of Religious Affairs and Home Affairs) and other re-
lated government officials who were involved in drafting the bill. In
line with the resolutions passed inits tanuir session, the Muhammadi-
yah's early attitude toward the issue was as follows:
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First, the Muhammadiyah was born into Islam, without which this or-
g \izaion would not be Muhammadiyah anymore.
Second, Pancasila was not a problem with the Muhammadiyah since its
leaders, i.e., Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Prof. Kahar Muzakkir and Kasman
Singodimedjo, participated in formulating Pancasila and accepted it [as the
basis and narional ideology of the statel on August 18,1945.
Third, based on this fact, the Muhammadiyah could include Pancasila in
its constitution without changing the basis of Islam which it used so far.166
The Muhammadiyah's concern with the issue prompred K. H.
AR. Fachruddin (its General Chairman) and irs other prominent lead-
ers to meet and consult directly with presidenr Soeharro on Seprem-
ber 22,1983. In this consultarion, the president informed Fachruddin
that the best course of action for the Muhammadiyah to take in rela-
tion to Pancasila as the sole basis was ro wair until the mass organiza-
tions law was promulgated. Regarding rhe nature of the Muhammadi-
yah as an Isiamic social movemenr, the President said to Fachruddin
that this nature could be clearly expressed in its program outlined in
its constitution, but that Pancasila had to be included it as it sole basis
under the chapter on its foundation.l6l Other sreps raken by the
Muhammadiyah were to hold meerings with the MUI, the NU and
some members of the PPP, exchanging views on rhe marrer. As far as
its input and suggestions to the DPR were concerned, the
Muhammadiyah claimed that about 60 percenr of its proposals were
accommodated and incorporated into the mass organizations bill.168
Five of the Muhammadiyah's mosr importanr proposals read:
(1) The president's statemenr rhar "Pancasila will not repiace religion,
and it is impossible for Pancasila to replace it. Pancasila will not
be made a religion, and it is impossible that religion will be made
equal to Pancasila," should be included in the mass organizarions
bill.
(2)Socio-religious organizations shouid be given the right to include
their own specific characteristic and identities.
(3) Socio-religious organizarions should be given the right to develop
their activities in accordance with their own religious reachings.l6e
(4) Socio-reiigious organizations should be given the right to develop
their activities in the affairs of women, yourhs and students in an
effort to incorporate them as cadres. Also, they should be given
the right to develop their activities in the field of religious propa-
gation, as well as in the field of education, health and other social
Programs.
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(5)The freezing and banning of a mass organizarion should be ex-
ecuted only after the Supreme Courr has issued a legal decision
fstating that the mass organization concerned violated the law].1i0
Vaiting for the official promulgation of the mass organizations
law, the Muhammadiyah decided to postpone its 4Lst national con-
gress, which had been scheduled to be held in Surakarta, Central
Java, in February 1984. Almosr rwo years larer, the congress finally
took place in Surakarta from DecemberT-!7,1985. At the invitation
of the central board of the Muhammadiyah, Presidenr Soehano ar-
tended the congress and delivered a welcoming speech saying:
The assertion of Pancasila as the sole basis not onlv means upholding its
principles, which are basically in agreernent with the teaching of our reli-
gion, but also strengthening our uniry and integrity as a narion. We are a
pluralistic nation in rerms of ethnic group, religion, race and social group.
\Y/ithout a comrnon philosophy such as Pancasila, we will be in conflict with
each other which will lead us to disunity...
The declaration of Pancasila as the sole basis not only means including it
in the constitution of an organizarion, but also obliges us to develop it in our
in social and national programs. \We rnust encllessly make every effort to
make Pancasila color all aspects of our social ancl national li{e.171
Having stressed the strategic role of Pancasila in the life of the narion
and its position vis-a-vis religion in the counrry, as well as his inten-
tion of stipulating Pancasila as rhe sole basis for all mass organiza-
tions, the presidenr then directed his remarks specifically to rhe
Muhammadiyah. Of course, his message also appliei to all orher mass
organizations in the counrry. Soeharto said:
The Muhammadiyah can develop many more activities in the life of the
nation. A great number of the members of the Muhammacliyah, who are
widely scattered in the counrry, have long made a valuable contribution to
the nation in various fields. Keep going in these efforts, and keep compeunll
with other mass organizations. The assertion of Pancasila as the sole basi.s is
not intended to minimize the wide range of efforts by the Muhammadivah,
but rather to encoruage it to be rnore advancecl in carrying out it-s efforts on
a wider scale.l7l
It was at the Surakarta congress that Muhammadiyah formally
accepted Pancasila as its sole basis. It should be noted that before this
acceptance had been made, pamphlers by Malik Ahmad objecting to
the imposition of Pancasila as the sole basis as being a threat to Isiam
surfaced again in the dormitories where most Muhammadiyah del-
egates were accommodated during the congress. Some cynics described
the acceptance by the Muhammadiyah ofPancasila as its sole basis as
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constituting "political suicide."173 However, thanks to the efforts of
Lukman Harun (b.1937), who was known for his "persuasive pow-
ers", the hard-liners within the Muhammadiyah were finally con-
vinced to accept Pancasila foundation.lza
According to article 2 of its reformuiated constitution, the
Muhammadiyah is "based on Pancasila." However, in keeping with
its character as a mass Islamic organization, article 1 of the Muham-
madiyah constitution states "it is a socio-religious movement with
the objective of enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil, sub-
scribing to the Islamic creed in conformity with the teachings of the
Qur'An and the Sunnah of the Prophet." The acceptance by the
Muhammadiyah of Pancasila as its sole basis, according to H. A. R.
Fachruddin, was like a motor-cyclist wearing a "safety helmet."1/s Dr
Amien Rais also asserted that the Muhammadiyah "easiiy" accepted
Pancasila principle,IT6 on the grounds that "Pancasila is a valid ticket
with which we could take the "bus" of Indonesia. Without this ticket,
we could not take that bus."177
The whole process illustrated above demonstrates that, despite
objections by some hard-liners at the beginning, the Muhammadiyah,
in adopting Pancasila as its sole basis, faced the problem calmly and
patiently, proposing ideas and suggestions, and conducting negotia-
tions and consultations in government circles in an attempt to influ-
ence the mass organizations bill. This meant that, on the whole, the
Muhammadiyah as an organization body preferred consultation and
avoided confrontation with the government in any form. The
President's guarantee that it could retain its nature as an Islamic so-
cial movement, and that Pancasila as the sole foundation was not
intended to minimize or restrict its activities, prompted the
Muhammadiyah to officially acquiesce at the Surakarta congress.
Thus, the theological issue surrounding Pancasila and Islam was re-
solved by the Muhammadiyah in such a way that the latter, Iike the
NU, did not abandon its nature as a socio-religious movement.
Tbe Responses of tbe MUI, HMI, PU and Otbers
Founded on July 26,1975, MUI178 plays an intermediate role be-
tween Muslims and the government. As indicated by its name, the
council serves to exercise ijtihhdandprovidesfatuAsto Muslims or to
the government on relation to social problems whose legal status
cannot be founded in either the Qur'in or hadith. The MUI at first
faced a dilemma in resoonse to Pancasila as the sole basis. since it
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considered both religion and nation to be important. In 7982, to-
gether with other associations, it met in the Consultative Body of
Religious Communities to discuss the issue fully. At the meeting, the
MllI, the MAWI, the DGI, the (Parishada Hindu Dharma Pusat, or
Representative Council of Indonesian Hindus) and the Walubi
(Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia, or Representative Council of
Indonesian Buddists) issued a declaration that "the religious council
and organizations, each of which possesses a basis of conformity with
its respective religion, appeal to their adherents to be loyal to their
own religion and at the same time to be good Pancasilaists.'l7e This
statement attempted to reconfirm religion as the basis of their re-
spective associations, while in the same breath it declared their obe-
dience to the national ideology of Pancasila. As Yunan Nasution,
one of the chief leaders of the MLII, puts it:
They appealed to the gorrernment: "Let us utilize own basis in our re-
spective constitutions as laid down since we were born in the land of Indone-
sia, that is our respective religions. This is our way of life here and guidance
for life in the Hereafter. Our basis does not pose a threat at all to Pancasila.
On the conuary, while we are developing the Islarnic community in concert
with our religious basis, we are also leading it to perform the five principles
of Pancasila in order to be Pancasilaists. Thus, in developing the Indonesian
nation, as we are doing now, our religious basis can be a "partner" to
Pancasila. "18o
A year later, at the Consultative Body's meeting held in Novem-
ber 1983, the MUI, the Walubi, the PHDP, the MAVI and the DGI
still defended their position in reiation to Pancasiia as the sole basis.
They stated that "religious associations and mass religious organiza-
tions continue to use their respective religions as their organizational
basis."181 Later, they all accepted Pancasila as their sole foundation
after the law had been formally promulgated by the government. As
far as the MUI was concerned, it formally adopted Pancasiia as its
sole basis at its national congress held in Jakarta in Juiy 1985. The
MUI clearly made Pancasila its sole basis in article 2 of its reformu-
lated constitution, while its nature as an Islamic organization was
expressed in article 1.
The HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Association of hlamic Stu-
dents)i82 also had a response to Pancasila as the sole foundation. Estab-
lished by Lafran Pane on February 5, t947 in Yogyakarta, the HMi is
known as an independent organizationwhich is not affiliated with any
political or social group in the country. However, thanks to its religious
outlook, which may be described as Islamic modernism, it currently
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close ties with the Muhammadiyah, and in the past was associated with
the Masnrmi. A militant and well-organizrdinstitution, the HMI played
an imponant role, as may be seen in the fact that;
Under Soekarno, the HMI established a tradition of opposition to the
government and became the most powerful students organization in the
country. Many leading Muslim personalities and intellectuals in Indonesia
today come from HMI ranks. In the later years of Guided Democracy, the
HMI came under frequent attack from the left, though efforts to have it
outlawed along with the Masyumi were unsuccessful. After Soekarno seized
power in 1965, the HMI was in the vanguard of the Student Action Front
(KAMD which rallied support in the big cities for the army in its anti-com-
munist crusade.l8i
'With good programs and well trained staff, the HMI has provided
national leadership. This can be seen from the fact that in the present
Indonesian cabinet (Sixth Development Cabinet) there are some HMI
alumni who have been appointed as Minisrers by the Presidenr, rwo
of whom are Mar'ie Muhammad (Finance Minister) and Akbar
Tanjung S4inister of Housing). In addition to this, the HMI has played
an important role in developing and elevating the intellectual capac-
ity of its members. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939), who graduated
from the University of Chicago, is just one of the HMI members
who have benefited from this development. Vhile being actively in-
volved in and leading the HMI for many years, Madjid has also made
every effort to further the education of the organization's members.
As a result, a large number of HMI alumni have become intellectuals
and scholars holding important positions and acquiring impressive
reputations.
In response to Pancasila being made the sole foundation for all
mass organizations, the HMI held a series of discussions at its 15th
national congress held in Medan, North Sumarra, in late May 1983.
Through theJunior Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs, Abdul Gafur,
(himself a former chairman of the HMI of the Jakarta branch), the
government pressed the HMI ro endorse Pancasila as its sole basis,
even though the mass organizarions bill was srill being prepared and
was in the process of being submitted by the government to the DPR.
According to Gafur, the HMI's adoption of Pancasila as its sole basis
would not uproot the specific narure of its movement, since this na-
ture could clearly be included in its programs.le The parricipanrs ar
the HMI congress split into rwo groups: the first wanred the HMI to
accept Pancasila as its sole basis, while the second objected and in-
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sisted that the HMi postpone its decision on the issue until the law
was formally promulgated.
Ahmad Zacky Siradj, former HMINational Chairman, in defend-
ing the organization's position in relation to Pancasila as the sole
basis at the time, said that for the HMI Pancasila was not a new thing
since one of the goals of its establishment was to defend the state of
the Republic of Indonesia with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution
as its basis.185 This can be interpreted as an assertion that Pancasila as
the basis of the state was not a probiem for the HMI; therefore, it
accepted and defended it. However, at its Medan congress, the HMI
showed some hesitance toward the government's idea of Pancasila as
the sole basis for all mass organizations. One objection expressed by
many prominent figures of the HMI was that Pancasila as the soie
basis would eliminate its specific Islamic identity and that it would
abolish the basically diverse nature of Indonesian society in general.rs
For the HMI, this condition would in turn pose a threat to the devel-
opment of the nation. An argument similar to this was also voiced by
General Abdul Haris Nasution:
Pancasila stresses hannony between diversity and unity. One cannot ex-
ist without the other. To emphasize diversity alone will destroy r.rnity. On
the other hand, to centralize unity through losing cliversity will lead us ttr
regimentation of our lives as a nation, as citizens and as ordinary people,
closing room for initiative, creativity and dynarnism.rsT
The opinion of the second group at the congress was so dominant
that it eventually became the HMI's position on the problem of the
sole basis; a development with which the government circles were
disappointed. Due to this attitude, the HMI was seen by the authori-
ties as refusing to endorse Pancasila as its sole basis. In 7984, a year
after the Medan congress, the central board of the HMI issued a book-
let entitled Pandangan Kritis terhadap RIJU KeorrnAsdnlss (A Critical
View of the Mass Organization Bill) in which it evaluated the bill as
having a potentialiy negative impact on mass organizations in gen-
eral and on Isiamic mass organizations in particular. Vhy? Because
the bill, according to the HMI, was part of a government politically
engineered project which was intended to establish a monolithic sys-
tem, designed to place the government in a very strong position.
With this as its aim it did not see the need for diaiogue in settling
issues. Referring to the 1945 Constitution which guarantees freedom of
expression and freedom of assembiy, the HMI questioned the proposed
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bill which, in its view, would give full authority to the government to
dissolve mass organizations. The HMI was of the opinion that if a mass
organization indeed violated a law isued by the state, it was the Execu-
tive Board, not the organization itself, that should be disbanded.lp
The HMI saw that the mass organization bill would give strong
powers to the government, with which it could restrict and even
interfere in the life and activities of a mass organization. In turn, this
situation would make mass organizations apathetic in the face of na-
tional affairs. If this situation continued to exist, the HMI stated,
Indonesia's political life in the future would become undemocratic.lrc
Holding this view, the HMI argued that,
Pancasila as the sole basis is acceptable and valid only in the context of the
state's life. This is in agreement with the correct notion of Pancasila men-
tioned in the 1945 Constitution. In line with the nature of the plurality of
Indonesian sociery, which is rooted in religion, the basic nature of this reli-
. 
gious socieqv cannot be uprooted. This means that lndonesian society, as indi-
viduals or groups, should receive legal protection to lead their lives according
to the teachings of their religions and according to their rights as cirizens.lel
The basic spirit of the above argument was in fact the same as that
of the HMI's decision at the Medan congress held the year before.
However, at irs meeting on April 1-7,1985, held at Ciloto, Jakarta,
the \Vorking Committee of the HMI resolved this matter by issuing
a statement that the HMI now agreed to adopt Pancasila as its sole
basis.1e2 This decision was later ratified by the HMI at its 16th na-
tional congress held in Padang, \West Sumatra, in 1986.1e3
Not all branches of the HMI, however, felt able to accepr rhe
decision made by both the'W'orking Committee and the congress of
the HMI in Padang; consequently, open reactions and protests came
from several of its branches. Theywere firmly united, and challenged
the Executive Board of the HMI by establishing a body called the
MPO (Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi, or Council to Save the Orga-
nization), led by Eggie Sudjana. This conflict become more serious
when the MPO claimed to take over the Jakarta office of the execu-
tive board, and establish its own executive board which was com-
pletely separate from the "official" one. The MPO-established board
became known as the "rival" HMIwhich firmly retained Isiam, rarher
than Pancasila, as its sole organizational basis. The rival HMI claimed
to be consistent with the original ideais of the HMI, and called itself
the "true" HMI. It bitterly accused the official HMI of deviating from
the true spirit of 1947 when the association was established. On the
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other hand, the official HMI accused the "rival" one of violating the
organization's constitution.l% \ilhile the official HMI held its 17th
national congress in Lhokseumawe (Aceh) in July 1988, the rival one
did the same thing in Yogyakarta, indicating the two sides remained
bitterly divided. The government, however, did not recognize the
uPstart HMI.
In adopting Pancasila as its sole basis, the HMI put forward the
following argument: that Islam and Pancasila were not in conflict, as
long as the latter was placed within its true historical context. It also
believed that the values of Pancasila would become rich, strong and
dynamic if it were based on Islamic norms and values which emanate
from divine revelation. This meant that Pancasila would become
meaningful and safe in the cradle of Islam.le5 Staning from this premise,
the HMI then reaffirmed its position, role and commitment to
Pancasila in the life of the nation:
(1) the HMI, as an Islamic organization, should always show its ca-
pacity to make the best contribution to the nation in line with its
sincere ideals;
(2)as a student organization, the HMI should implement Pancasila
in a rational and realistic way;
(3) as part of the nation, the HMI should play an important role and
set a good example in carrying out Pancasila; and
(4) as an organization for the younger generation, the HMI should be a
pioneer in socializing Pancasila, and should take responsibility to
prevent any deviation from its true values as establishedin 7945.r%
Nurcholish Madjid commented that the HMI's acceptance Pancasila
as its sole basis was a good decision since, by doing so, it put Islam
and Pancasila on the right path within the context of "Indonesianness".
Its acceptance of Pancasila, Mad.iid said, would not diminish or abol-
ish its specific Islamic identity, or the special characteristics which
had been with the HMI since its birth.lel
The PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students
Union),1e8 established on May 4,1947 in Yogyakarta, took a different
road in response to Pancasila as the sole basis. Like the HMI, the PII was
an independent organization which was not affiliated to any political or
social Islamic organization. However, the PII had close links with the
HMI and other Muslim Modernist organizations due to its religious
outlook, and subscribed to Islamic modernism. An organizationfor
Muslim students of senior high schools, the PII persisted in defending
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klam as its sole basis and firmly refused to replace ir with Pancasila. Due
to this attitude, the Minister of Home Affairs, through his decisions
numbered 720 and 127 of December I0,1987, banned the Ptr on rhe
ground that it did not comply with the fundamental principles of the
mass organizations lawJn As far as the Islamic mass organizations
were concerned, this government ban applied only to the PII.
General Chairman of the PII, Murammimul Ula, defended the
position of his organization by saying that the PII was legally obliged
to use Islam as its sole basis, to the exclusion of all others. ula claimed
that the decision of his organization nor ro subscribe to Pancasila as
its sole basis was made by the Ptr after deeply and thoroughly exam-
ining Pancasila from legal, sociological and philosophical standpoints
in the light of Islamic doctrine.2m Vith the banning of the ptr, it
could be said that the Muslim community, parricularly the circle of
Muslim modernist groups, losr one of its national asiets, in which
young Muslim cadres had been trained as skillful and capable leaders.
To a great exrenr the PII had contributed to the strength of the HMI,
since the former's alumni mosrly joined the latter shortly after they
finished senior high school and continued their studies ar various
unlversltles.
Thus, joining the NU in adopting Pancasila as rheir sole basis
were the Muhammadiyah, the HMI, the MUI and all other Islamic
mass organizations (except the PII) such as the Persis, the perti, the
Syarikat Isiam,201 the PMtr (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia,
or Indonesian Muslim university studenr Movement) and others. This
action was taken by Islamic mass organizations because the govern-
ment allowed them to maintain the nature of their movements and
activities, and allowed them to continue to observe their socio-reli-
gious activities according to their religious aspirations and ideals, as they
had done so previously. In this light it appeared that the governmenr
would not diminish or abolish the pluraliry of Indonesian society, but would
allow social and religious aspirations to flourish; a situation which wor-
ried the Muslim mass organizations, as it did orher mass organizations
throughout Indonesia.
Tbe Responses of Indiaidual Muslims and Splinter Groups
Opposition from certain individual Muslims and Muslim solinter
groups to the governmerir's proposal of applying Pancasila as the
sole.basis was srrong and bitter. They firmly rejected this proposal
on the grounds that Pancasila wouid become a religion, and thai reli-
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gion would be Pancasilaized. They feared that, with the stipulation
of Pancasila as the sole basis, Muslims would no longer be allowed by
the government to establish, maintain or develop religious and social
organizations according to Islamic aspirations. This kind of fear can
be seen, for example, in the feelings of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, as
said earlier, who bravely sent a long letter, dated July 7, !983,to
President Soeharto expressing his strong objection to Pancasila as the
sole basis. In his letter, Prawiranegara first underlined Soeharro's srate-
ments made i n the N uzttl a [-Qur'An commemorat io n of Jun e 27, 19 83,
that "Pancasila and religion are not in opposition to each other and
must not be made to oppose each other" and "Pancasila is not a reli-
gion and cannot ever replace religion."202
In essence, Prawiranegara agreed with Soeharto's statement, but
was afraid of the government's policy of stipulating Pancasila as rhe
sole basis. For this reason, he expressed his fear to the President say-
ing, "However, even if Pancasila is not a religion, with the power
that iies in your hands and with the support of the People's Repre-
sentative Council-which reflect more the sovereignty of the presi-
dent than of the people-Pancasila is de facto put into effect and is
being enforced as a comprehensive religion, thar touches on all as-
pects of the lives of those human beings who are Indonesian citi-
zens.":Or In a similar tone to this statement, Prawiranegara said fur-
ther, "If Pancasiia, rarher than being the foundation of the state has
to be turned into the basis of human life, then this means that the
religions revealed by Almighty God (or perceived) have to be ex-
changed for an ideology, which does not call itself a religion, but in
its behavior seems to wish to replace existing religions.2ft
In expressing his objection to the President's idea of applying
Pancasila as the sole basis, Prawiranegara also underlined certain opin-
ions expressed in the editorial of the Kompas newspaper of. July 4,
1983, which had discussed the mass organizations bill when it was
being prepared. The editorial said,
If the issue is viewed solely frorn the standpoint of practical politics, the
government, with the sr.rpport of majorities in the representative bodies and
the surfeit of power it possesses can, as it were, enforce anything is pleases,
and the comrnunity wiii acquiesce, at least formally, and for as long as the
power stnrcture supporting it remains effective.
Still, because what is to be achieved and preserved is essentially a politi-
cal infrastructure and a political culture which is to unify the nation and rhe
state, rnere formal acquiescence, without the process of dialogue, cannot suf-
fice.
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A statesmanlike political approach will at the same time strive to im-
plant strong 100ts and build a firm stnrcture, so that not only formal acqui-
escence and erforcement are achieved but rather a fonn of dialogue that is
national oriented, so that, even though it may take some tirne, a national
consensus will ultimately be attained.2os
Prawiranegara was of the opinion that replacing an Islamic founda-
tion with a Pancasila foundation would not only be contrary to Is-
lamic teachings, but also to the L945 Constitution in which the "offi-
cial" Pancasila is mentioned. He said that Muslim people in general
were afraid to express their true feelinp in the face of the government's
idea of Pancasila as the sole basis for fear of losing their positions,
offices, or salaries, or being considered confrontational dissidenrs.
Taking moral responsibility f.or the Islamic cause, Sjafruddin
Prawiranegara seemed to establish himself at the forefront of those
who voiced Muslim feelings in the face of rhe issue of Pancasila as the
sole basis. He said that the ob jections in his letter were not intended
to provoke a confrontation with the President, but rather were an
expression of his rights and duties as an Indonesian citizen in confor-
mity with freedom of opinion and expression, freedoms guaranteed
and protected by the constitution. Prawiranegara was of the opinion
LIIdI
Replacing an Islamic foundation with Pancasila foundation conflicts with
a constitntion which is based upon Pancasila, and thus is in contravention
with Pancasila itself. This is the original Pancasila, which fonned the basrs
of the 1945 constitution. What is plain in that to exchange this basis conrra-
venes the freedorn of religion and worship guaranteed by article 29, para-
grapir (2) of the Constitution. Because, according to Islarnic teachings, the
establishment of an Islarnic association whose mernbership consists of Mus-
lirns who want to practice Islarnic teachings together-that is an association
which is based upon Islarn- is in itself an act of worship which is blessecl by
Allah. For, accorcling to the teachings of Allah, all Believers are brothers,
And therefore it is good for them to establish organizations (-r)nsisting of
Muslims, in whatever fie1d.ro6
From the above quotation, it is clear that Prawiranegara was afraid
that, with the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis, the govern-
ment would contravene freedom of religion and worship as well as
freedom of association and assembly, and would also abolish the spe-
cific identity of hlamic organizations. In his view, this situation, would
in the end, result in the restriction and even prohibition of Muslims
establishing and running Islamic organizarions; consequenrly, Islam
would become simply a privare marrer, which would have norhins
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to do with social and political life. The sole basis plan, he said, was a
systematic attempt designed and launched by the government not
only to depoliticize but also to "kill" Islam through Pancasila. As he
puts it:
If Muslims are no longer allowed to establish Islamic organizations-
whether political organizations or social organizations-then Islarn will corne
to be regarded as a private matter, which is completely contrary to Islarnic
teachings. The Islamic religion is not merely a private matter' but is also,
primarily, a matter oI the ummah [community]. ...if the Indonesian Muslim
community is to be prohibited from establishing and maintaining Islamic
associations, whether in the political field or in other social fields, this is not
only in contravention of the 1945 Constitution, and thus in contravention
of Pancasila itself, but in practice means an attempt to kill Islarn-through
Pancasila!207
In keeping with the above arguments, Prawiranegara was of the
view that the President's idea of applying Pancasila as the soie basis
would pose a serious danger to the continued development o{ mass
organizations, particularly Islamic mass organizations, and to the basic
nature of cultural pluralism flourishing in Indonesian society. Es-
pousing this view, he warned Soeharto in his letter that "making
Pancasila the sole foundation for all social organizations may, at first
glance, appear to be the way to bring about national unity and social
improvements. But believe me, you will only achieve the opposite. I
hope that you, Mr. President, are aware of the dangers threatening
our country and people if the sole foundation plan should be imple-
mented.":08 Having warned the President, Prawiranegara then ap-
pealed to him by saying "...a[ter you have read this letter of mine,
you will agree at the very least to halt the enforcement of Pancasila as
the sole foundation,"2@ and closed by requesting of him that
...all citizens be allowed to establish a.ny orgtnization whatsoever, so
long as the aim of these organizations is to work for the benefit of Indone-
sian socieqv, and in pursuit of their objectives they refrain frorn all illegal
actions, especially the use of force. This would be in accordauce with article
28 of the Constitution which guarantees the principles of freedorn of assocta-
tion and assernbly, and of the expression of opinion both spoken and writ-
ing, as laid out by Bung Karno in his address at the end of the BPUPKI's
session on June I,1945, and also in accordance with the promises of the New
Order at the beginning of its career-namely your prornises to implernent
the 1945 Constitution in a pure and principled nanner.:lo
The President, however, did not respond specifically to Prawirane-
gara's letter. Vhile repeating his guarantee not to make Pancasila a
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religion and not to make religion equal to Pancasila, the President
persi$ed in his idea of stipulating it as the sole basis in the belief that
this policy would be strategically meaningful and provide great ad-
vantages to the life of the nation as a whole.
Objections to the Pancasila foundations plan were also raised by
kattb (sermon deliverer) on the occasion of their khutbahs, especially
in the country's political center (]akarta) where dissent became par-
ticularly heated at the time. For instance, in a khutbah given after
shalat 'ld al-Fitr of 1983, H. M. Yunan Nasution said that Muslims,
who constitute a significant majority of the Indonesian population,
had accepted and advocated Pancasila as the foundation of the state
and had implemented it in their daily life in conformity with the
basic spirit of each principle mentioned in Pancasila. He said that
Pancasila as the foundation of the state had been finalized long ago
when Muslims accepted it on those terms; therefore, Pancasiia was
no longer a problem for them.211 This stance can be seen, for ex-
ample, in the following statement made by Muhammad Roem, one
of the founding fathers of the Republic and a former leading figure of
the Masyumi: "I accept Pancasila because I am a Muslim."212 Thus,
for Muslims, Pancasila and Islam are not in conflict and must not be
made to oppose each other. Opposition was voiced, however, by
various segments of the Muslim community when the government
made its initial attempt to apply Pancasila as the sole foundation for
all mass organizations. In response to this attempt, Yunan Nasution
for one questioned why the government would extend the role of
Pancasila in this fashion. This move, in Nasution's view, would re-
place an Islamic foundation with a Pancasila foundation, giving the
impression that Islam was disliked and distrusted in the social and
national life of Indonesians. To quote his own words:
Why should there be an idea [held by rhe government] not to allow
rnass organizations to use their own specific bases, Islam for example, in
their constitutions? Does not this idea give the impression that the reli-
gion of Islam is disliked and distrusted in the social and national life of
our country?
If the idea of Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties is to
be extended to be applied to all rnas-s organizations, and this process is {inally
enforced in the narne of democracy, a fear will arise and will be felt, by
Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular, like a bone skidded in
flesh which props up the body. The fear will becorne more widespreacl if
there is a certain group [in the government circle] which accuses those who
have different opinions [regarding Pancasila] of being anti-Pancasila...I3
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Funhermore,in a khutbah delivered after the observance of the salAt
'Id al-Fitr of 1983 in a district of Jakarra, A. M. Farwa sternly opposed
the idea of Pancasila as the sole foundation, and called for Muslims to
advocate "the basis of Islam until the last drop of their blood.'214 Abdul
Qadir Djaelani echoed the same view as Farwa when he called for Mus-
lims to firmly and consistently subscribe to "rhe sole basis of Islam."215
Like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who saw the idea of the sole foundation
as a dangerous attempt to "kill" Islam through Pancasila, Djaelani was of
the opinion that the mas organizations bill was political engineering
systematically designed by the governmenr "ro bury all Islamic organi-
zations in Indonesia. Therefore, it is forbidden for us ro agree ro rhis bill,
and obligatory {or us ro rejecr ir."216
In response to this opposition, the government censored the text
of khuthbahs to be delivered by Muslims at prayer services such as 7/
al-Fitr and'Id al-Adha. As a result, vigorous opposition ro rhe mass
organizations bill mounred from a small group of militant Muslims.
Sirajuddin Syamsuddin (b. 1958) described this explosive siruation as
follows:
...there was restlessness in the Muslim cornmunity regaicling the issue of
Pancasila as the sole foundation.. Many Muslim leaders were concerned that
the process of Pancasilaization would mean de-Islamization. Many preach-
ers used the Friday prayer forum and other religious gatherings to raise the
issue and evoke Muslims' religious sentirnen$ to reject Pancasila becomrng
the sole constitution. For them, Muslim acceptance of Pancasila as a national
consensus should not be understood as a theological statemenr, but only as a
political sraremenr.217
Signing a statemenr rejecring Pancasila as the sole basis for mass orga-
nizations, many of those who made up this splinter or militant Muslim
group claimed to be prepared to die as marryrs for the cause of klam.218
For them, Islam was their sole ideology and distinct identity. They be-
lieved that it should nor be replaced by or subordinated ro any orher
ideology, such as Pancasila. Moreover, according to this group, the re-
placement of Islam with another ideologywould mean de-hlamization,
which they viewed as conrrary ro rhe basic teaching of Isiam. In re-
sponse to this wave of opposition, the government repeatedly guaran-
teed that the stipulation of Pancasila as the sole basis was nor in-
tended to replace religion, and that it was impossible for Pancasila to
replace it. The governmenr conrinued to lay emphasis on the fact that
Pancasila would not become a sorr of reiigion or rival to ir.21e This firm
guarantee, however, did not appease the militants' heated feelings.
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The tension between this Muslim splinter group (comprising of
about f,SOO people) and the gover-nment's sicurity forces finally
,.".hed'a clima" with the o.ribre"k of the bloody confrontation'
known as the Tanjunf ftioft affair, which took place in port area of
ilr..r* on S.pr.-b ,ilz, t98+''20 This confrontation was sparked by
the actions of these Murii* hardliners in burning a motorcy-cle be-
longing to Sergeant Hermanu, a member of the Babinsa (Binara
PembinaDesd, or non-commissioned officers responsible for the su-
;ffi;t 
"f "ifi"g*1. 
fftey did so.in responst to i report that he had
enrered the mosque of al-A,raf without taking off. his sho.es; this is a
mosque where ,.rrnon, hrd frequently been given bl Y"tIT preach-
.r, .iif i.g for the ,.,..rion of pancasila as the sole basis. The crowd
;;r;.;t".sentful of s.rg..n, H€rmanu,s action and regarded it as
an affront to the r.;;;J f;our. of Allah. The crowd also demanded
the release of four of their members who had been detained by the
security forces'
In contrast to the government's version' which claimed that a pre-
liminary warning *i gi',.n to the rioters, another report stated that;if,. 
,rfiy was firid on "*irhou, warning by heavily armed troops"''1
According to an official report released by the go":l"Tt1t' nine
p.opl. *!re shot to death and 53 were inlured in this incident.22l
Some unofficial ,epo,is, however, cited by Syamsuddin' stated that
,,hundreds of Musiims ii.d .t the hands of the Indonesian army,"L'
ftg"t. ftt greater th;; that reported by the government' Amir Biki'
knowntobeoneolthepromi"entleadersofthisgrouP'w-asoneofthe
victimsintheTanjungP'iokriot.Theplaceweretheconflictoccurred
was qrrickly cleansed 6y th. securiry forces of blood and other evidence,
,o 
-.k. it ,ee- that t(e tragic incident had not mken place at all'
rong after the i"nl.rng-priok incident, families of th.e victims did
not knJ* where the bodils of the slain were buried, and yet chose to
keep silent because they were-afraid to question the government on the
-**.r. Later, it *as ,epo,ted that the bodies of 
allthe victims' except
the remains of Amir eit i 1*6icn were sent to his family to be buried),
were interred by the ,..u'ity forces in a mas grave. in the village of
Jeger, KampungR .butan @,astJaka n^)'* The meantime' those people
who were suspected to have bein leaders of the riot or of having op-
posed pancasiia as the sole basis were arrested and brought to trial by
the governm.rr, o.t rh. accused of launching subversive actions' Aiong
thei-, *.r. H. Oesman al-Hamidy (rector of the PTDI, Perguruan
iinggi Dakwrf, frfr-, o, Coiiege fo,lsiamic Propagation), Abdul Qadir
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Djaelani, Tony Ardie and Mawardi Noor. All of them were impns-
oned after the courts found them guilty in connection with the Tanjung
Priok riot or for their rejeaion of Pancasila as the sole basis.E Al-Hamidy,
to mention just one example, was jailed for eight years.
H. R. Dharsono and A. M. Fatwa were also arrested and impris-
oned. Together with their friends in the Petition of Fifty Group,
Dharsono and Fatwa called for the establishment of a national "inde-
pendent" fact-finding commission to investigate the Tanjung Priok
affair thoroughly and fairly, including the real number of victims.226
Their appeal, however, did not receive any response from the gov-
ernment. A retired army general who was critical of government
policies, Dharsono once bravely attacked the government by saying
that "there is a basic contradiction between the tolerant nature of
Pancasila and its actual intolerance in practice."u Thus, according to
Dharsono, there was a gap between ideals and reality, or between
what should be and what is, in the implementation of Pancasila by
the New Order government.
Following the eruption of the Tanjung Priok riot, a series of vio-
lent actions were launched between 1984 and 1985 by Muslim poiiti-
cal splinter groups in many parts of the country. Some of these dis-
turbances, which posed a threat to the order and stability of the gov-
ernment, took the form of bombinp at the Bank Central Asia (BCA)I8
inJakarta, the Borobudur Buddist temple at Muntilan (CentralJava)D
and the Marine Base at Cilandak (|akarta). These "militant" or "fun-
damentalist" movements did not however, win the support of the
majority of Muslims as a mainstream political force. As far as the
Tanjung Priok incident was concerned, many Muslim leaders regret-
ted the way the government's armed forces handled the affair in caus-
ing such loss of life. The number of victims in that incident, Muslims
argued, could in fact have been minimizedif the situation had been
handled differently. Many people in Muslim circles tended ro pur rhe
blame on General Benny Moerdani, Commander-in-Chief of ABRI
at the time and a Christian. They considered him to be the person
most responsible for the Tanjung Priok incident.
From the above discussion, it can be seen rhar the Muslim com-
munity in general accepted Pancasiia as the sole basis for all political
parties and for all mass organizations. It seems that the government
was satisfied with the Muslim attitude, despite the fact that certain
dissenters objected to and rejected Pancasila as the sole basis. In spite
this fact, the government tended to ignore these objections, and laid
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strong emphasis on the significance of the majority of the Muslim
community's acceptance of this new role for Pancasila. Seen in this
political context, the government felt that its policy of applying
Pancasila as the sole basis was successful. Following these historical
events, many Muslim leaders commented that Muslims' acceptance
of Pancasila as the sole foundation constituted a sound development
which promised a positive result for Islam and Muslims in the future.
Lukman Harun (former Secretary General of the Parmusi and former
Chairman of the Muhammadiyah), for example, said that, with Mus-
lims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis, the government's long
and bitter suspicion of them had ended, just as the negative image of
Muslims as opponents of the government had disappeared.ao
Syahirul Alim (a senior lecturer at Gajah Mada University of
Yogyakarta and a prominent Muslim preacher who has periodically
been detained by the government for months at a time) said something
similar to F{arun, and added that^ny attempt by any individual or group
to compare Islam with Pancasiia was simply a game of political manipu-
lation and aimed to destroy the good and harmonious relations berween
the Muslims and the government.23l Echoing this statement,
Imaduddin Abdulrahim (likewise once detained for fourteen months
because of his "severe" criticism of the government) said that there
was no longer a dichotomy between the ruier and the ruled since
there was no longer a boundary between Muslims and the govern-
ment. "The government is Islamic too," he stressed with confidence.u
In the meantime, in order to convince the government of their
Ioyalty, many prominent Muslim leaders repeatedly stated that an
Islamic state in Indonesia was not the goal of Muslim political aspira-
tions. Jusuf Hasjim, for his part, stated that at none of the meetings
held by the PPP (when it still served as an Islamic party) was the idea
of an Islamic state ever consideredr3 According to E.Z. Murraqien (a
former Masyumi leader and one of the prominent figures of the MLII),
the idea of an Islamic state, politically speaking, was nor as impor-
tant, for Indonesian Muslims, as was the implementation of Islamic
teachings to the fullest extent possible within Muslim social life. in
his view, Islamic teachings were gradually being implemented by the
government, as could be seen, for instance, from the fact that it had
issued regulations on zakar fitrah (alms) and that it had banned all
forms of gambling. Muttaqien further asserted that, in fact, the issue
of an Islamic state had been exaggerated by anti-Islamic elements who
wanted to create a situation in which rhe governmenr and Muslims
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would distrust and oppose each other.e
Furthermore, according to the opinion of Imaduddin Abdulrahim,
Muslims were very h.ppy with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution,
believing that if both were implemented in a just and pure manner,
they would provide a good atmosphere in which Islamic ideals could
be actualized.Es Saifuddin Anshari (b. 1938) was of the view that the
issue of an Islamic state in Indonesia was an old song that should
never be sung again. According to Anshari, the label "Islamic srare"
should be in agreement with Islamic values.e In this connecrion,
Nurcholish Madjid also said that Pancasila was advantageous for
Muslims since it provided them with the opportunity to materialize
Islamic values in the lives of Muslims in Indonesia. For this reason he
strongly believed that the primary goal for the Muslims should not
be to establish an Islamic state, but to implement Islamic values in
their coilective social lives.r/
Government Policies towards Muslims in the Aftermath
As a consequence of Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole
basis for all poiitical parties and mass oqganizations and rheir repeated
claim that they have abandoned the idea of an Islamic stare, reiations
between Muslims and the government have improved, and the larter
has fundamentally changed its policies rowards the former. A new
era of co-operation between two sides began in the late 1980s and a
friendly atmosphere has continued to develop. Many people in Mus-
lim circles have commented that an intimacy or honeymoon condi-
tion between the governmenr and Muslims has arisen, and that it is
not expected ro end soon.
The government has abandoned the "severe" and "strict" policies
which it had imposed upon Muslims for almost rwenry years. How-
ever, it should be noted that this change in policy has been restricted
to the "cultural" Islam, to the exclusion of the "political" Islam. In
the light of this, critics say that rhe governmenr has in fact foiiowed a
policy similar ro rhar advocated by Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1857-
1936)when he served as an experr advisor ro Dutch colonial officials
in Indonesia. As Ira M. Lapidus puts it :
The poliry of the Soekarno and Soeharto governments toward Musliu
rnovemenc was an echo of the policies introduced by the Drtch towards the
end of the nineteenth century. The Dutch distinguished between the religious
and the political aspects of Islam, rolerating the former and repressing the lat-
ter,238 Following the same line of thought, rhe Javanese rnilitary and burear.r-
cratic elite has broken down the political power of the Muslirn panies.,e
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In words that echo those of Lapidus, Mohammad Atho' Mudzhar
(b.1943), a Muslim scholar and a graduate of UCLA, also points out that
"although ofiicially the government policy towards Islam is sympathetic
just as it is towards any other religion, in practice it is sympathetic only
towards cultural hlam, and remains suspicious of political Islam."2{
In spite of this, Muslims in general seem to be satisfied with gov-
ernment policy, as can be seen, for example, in Nurcholish Madjid's
statement in the 1970s, "Islam, Yes! Islamic parties, No!" This state-
ment implied that Islamic parties should be rejected because they are
no longer impoitant tools to pursue Muslim political interests. On
the other hand, the Muslim community has been encouraged to
strengthen and develop its social, cultural and intellectual founda-
tions in an effort to achieve the progress and glory of Islam in a fu-
ture Indonesia. This encouragement seems to have been stressed be-
cause, as Dr. Imaduddin Abdulrahim has argued, "the government is
also Islamic in character," and has in fact struggled for the interests
of Muslim. Indeed, as Munawir Sjadzali argued in some of his state-
ments referred to above, the government has served Muslims' inter-
ests better in the absence of Islamic parties.
Cbanges in Gooernment Policies Regarding Socio-Religious Affairs
Actually, prior to the Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole
basis, the government had demonstrated some of its "positive" poli-
cies towards them. In 1975, the government moved to heip a group
of "'ulamX" establish the MUI in view of their important position in
the Muslim community and of their significant role in the process of
the implementation of national development. Fulfilling a strategic
role, the MUI was expected to 'translateo the government's ideas and
policies on the national development program into "religious" lan-
guage so that all segments of the Muslim community, particularly at
the grassroots level, couid understand them and then participate ac-
tively in the national development process. At the same time, rhe
MUI served to transmit Muslim aspirations and interests to the gov-
ernment and to the People's Legislative Body. In addition, the MUI
has also provided religious guidance and legal opinions ro the gov-
ernment and to the legislative, executive and judiciary branches in
order that they do not violate the shari'ah and other Islamic teach-
ings.2a1 In short, the MUI has played an important role in bridging
the gap between the Muslim community and the government, and
bringing the two sides closer rogerher.
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In relation to the other religious communities existing in the coun-
try, the MLII has acted as a Muslim representative body consulting
with community members to resolve the religious issues faced in
their common social life. In this way misunderstandings among reli-
gious communities have been avoided. In fact, the establishment of
the MllI has provided advantages to both Muslims and the govern-
ment. The success of the government's family planning and transmi-
gration programs, for example, have been partly due to the role of
the MUI in particular and the 'ulaml' in general. On the issue of
family planning, for instance, the MIII issued afarwa saying that it
was permitted and encouraged by Islamic doctrine; therefore, Mus-
lims have practiced family planning and, as a result, the program
has greatly contributed to the success of the government's efforts
to reduce the population growth rate.
On February 17, 1982, Soeharto (in his capacity as a Muslim citi-
zen and not as Presidend established a foundation called YAMP
(Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila, or Fouhdation for the Dedi-
cation of Pancasilaist Muslims) with himself as Chairman. According
to Sjadzali, the foundation of YAMP was motivated by the fact that
the Muslim community still needed much more funding in order to
establish or renovate houses of prayer and mosques throughout the
country.2+2 Usually the Muslim community itself, rather than the
government, is encouraged to establish or renovate its mosques. How-
ever, realizing that Muslims still needed much more money for this
purpose, Soeharto, as a member of the Muslim community took the
initiative to raise funds through the YAMP. ByJuly 1990, the YAMP
has succeeded in establishing almost 400 mosques of varying sizes in
various parts of the country, each at a cost of between 110-130 mil-
lion rupiahs.243 To raise funds, all Muslim government employee and
all Muslim members of ABRi, according to their ranks, were
strongly encouraged to contribute a certain amount of money to
the YAMP each month. By the end of 7997, r.he YAMP had funds
totalling 83 billion rwpiahs.24 By this means, the YAMP contin-
ues to finance its activities.
In cooperation with the YAMP and with Soeharto's consent' the
MUI sent 1,000 Muslim preachers to provide Islamic instruction to
Muslim settlers in various pans of the country. This program was car-
ried out because many of them needed spirirual and moral guidance in
the resettlement areas where they had begun their new lives. These
Muslim preachers received from the YAMP a cenain amount of money
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every month to support them during their stay in these areas.245 In addi-
tion to the YAMP, President Soeharto supported Muslim efforts to
establish rhe Bank Muamalat Indonesia in 199 1. Professionally admin-
istered byMuslim entrepreneurs, businesmen and bankers, this bank
opened for business with capital of 100 billion rupiahs. The estab-
lishment of this bank was intended to provide loans, in particular to
Muslims, to develop economic activities and businesses in order to
achieve prosperity which, in turn, would contribute to improving
the welfare of the Muslim community as a whole. Unlike public banks,
this Islamic bank operates without charging its borrowers any inter-
est.246
The government has been very much concerned with the contin-
ued improvement of the infrastructure and administration of.the hajj.
This concern is always presented within the GBHN as one of the
most important national policies. Munawir Sjadzali (lvlinister of Re-
ligious Affairs and responsible for the administration of the haj) re-
ported that the Saudi Arabian government was very impressed with
the Indonesian government's administration of.'r.he hajj,which is con-
ducted by the Department of Religious Affairs. According to the Saudi
Arabian government, Sjadzali also reported, the Indonesian govern-
ment's administration of rhe hajjis one of the best when compared
with that of other Muslim countries.zaz It is important in this context
to mention that over twelve hundred Indonesian hajjs died in an acci-
dent in Mecca in 1990. To commemorate this national tragedy, Mus-
lims, strongly encouraged and supported by President Soeharto, es-
tablished memorial hospitals at the bajj embarkation ports in Jakarta,
Surabaya, Medan and Ujung Pandang. Soeharto also supported a group
of Muslims in the establishment of the IPHI (Ikatan Persaudaraan
Haji Indonesla, or Association of Indonesian Hajjis).248
In addition, as Sladzali also notes, in 1980 President Soeharto also
instructed that a large new building be erected for the Department of
Religious Affairs in a part of the complex situated on Lapangan Ban-
teng Barat Street, which had previously belonged to the Kodam
(K.omando Daerah Militer) or Military District Command) of Jakarta.
Sjadzali explained that, apart from in Saudi Arabia, he had never, in
any other Muslim country, seen a uaqf andlslamic affairs building as
large as the one designed for the Department of Religious Affairs in
the Republic of Indonesid.2ae More importantly, the location of the
Department of Religious Affairs building is very strategic because its
close to the Istiqlal Mosque of Jakarta, a great mosque constructed
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during the Soekarno era in commemoration of the independence
struggle in which many Muslims died as martyrs to Isiam and their
country. In connection with this, it is also worth mentioning that,
for the same purpose, a mosque called the Syuhada Mosque was also
built by Muslims in Yogyakarta during the Soekarno era.
Another of the government's national policies that reflects Islamic
values and Muslim interest is the continuation of the national Qur'lnic
reading competition (Musabaqah Tilauatil Qur'an Tingkat Nasional).
This competition, which costs billions of rupiahs and takes place in
different provincial cities, is officially opened by the President as a
maior event and is broadcasted on national television to Musiims
through out the country. The funding for the competition mostly
comes from the government, while the rest is made up of contribu-
tions from Muslim entrepreneurs and private businesses. In addition
to this, since the late 1980s, Arabic language instruction has been
provided to Muslims once a week through the government national
television. This program had long been requested by Muslims, but
only in the late 1980s did the government meet their request and
allow it to be included among national television programs. Almost
ar rhe same time (1991), with the support of the Soeharto govern-
ment, Muslims held an Islamic culturai exhibition called the Istiqlal
Festival which was viewed as a success since it attracted a large
audience. More importantly, this festival was held in the Istiqial
Mosque complex in Jakarta, and can be seen as the only great
Islamic cultural festival to have been held thus far in the history
of Indonesian Islam.
In the meantime, at the beginning of the 1990s, the government
finally abolished the SDSB (Surnbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah, or lir-
erally, social contribution with reward) which, in practice, was con-
sidered by Muslims to be a form of lottery, and therefore, in their
opinion prohibited according to Islamic Law. Before its aboiition,
Muslims were very concerned about the negative impact of the SDSB
on the moral life of Muslims and on society as a whole. Despite their
stern opposition, the SDSB, having obtained formal permission from
the government (the Minister of Sociai Affairs), continued to be car-
ried out under the government's national plan. It was only after
Muslims' acceptance of Pancasila as the sole basis that the SDSB was
abolished. Understandably, the Muslim were very pleased with this
governmental policy.rto
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Tbe Restnrctuilng of tbe IAIN's and Improoements to tbe National
Educational System
In the field of education, the New Order government continued
its efforts to improve the national education system from which
Muslims' have naturally benefited. The government endeavored to
improve and develop the status of the fourteen IAINs in the country.
For this purpose, in 1985 it issued Government Regulation No. 33
which, among other things, gave the IAINs which are officially ad-
ministered by the Department of Religious Affairs, the same status,
organizational structure, facilities and treatment as the universities
which are formally administered by the Department of Education
and Culture. Government Regulation No. 33 was then confirmed
and elaborated upon by Presidential Decree No. 9 of.1987. Vith the
issuing of this decree, the existence, status and organizational struc-
ture of the IAINs were improved and developed, while they achieved
the same legal status as the state universities in the country.5l In the
meantime, on February 16,7991, the government (through the Di-
rector General of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools in the
Department of Education and Culture) issued the letter of decision
No. 100/C/Kep./D/t991whereby it allowed female Muslim students
of junior and senior state high schools through out the country to
wear the jilbab. As we saw in the second chapter, the government
had formerly prohibited them from wearing this article of clothing,
although due to strong opposition from Muslims it gave them the
opportunity to move to private schools.
In 1989 the government issued Law No. 2 on the national educa-
tional systemwhich, among other things, confirms and emphasizes that
religious teaching constitutes a sub-system of the national educational
system. The law also confirms that religion constitutes an obligatory
subject which must be taught in all public schools from the elementary
to university levels, and it aiso acknowledges the important role of reii-
gious educational institutions in the proces of national character build-
ing.52It should be noted that, at the beginning, the national educational
system bill aroused reactions and criticism from the Muslim faction.
Lukman Harun, a leader and spokesperson for the Muhammadiyah,
criticized the bill as deviating from the stipulation in the GBHN that
religious instruction should be compulsory at all levels of education.
Harun stated that in the draft version of the proposed national cur-
riculum, religious instruction is not mentioned excepr for the pri-
mary school level. In his view, the bill was secular in narure.53 Many
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people in Muslim circles saw that the status of the madrasih (Islamic
schools) was left unclear. According to one of its articles, the bill
states that acceptance of a student in an educational unit might not
depend on religion, sex, race, social status or economic capacity. As
far as the issues of religion and sex were concerned, the bill implicitly
affected some madrasahs, such as those run by the Muhammadiyah,
which were only for men or only for women.e Muslim criticism of
the national educational system bill 'also reflects a tendency among
Muslim institutions to suspect the government of eroding the role of
Islam, under the state ideology of Pancasila."55 However, after revi-
sions were made based on substantial suggestions from Muslims in
particular, the bill was finally modified and passed by the DPR, thus
satisfying the Muslims and benefiting them at the same time.
Tbe Restruuuring of tbe Religious Courts
Islamic law, strangely enough, was one field in which Muslims
and the government were able to co-operate in introducing reforms,
and from an early date too. It is generally accepted, particularly in
Muslim circles, that Islamic law constitutes a sub-system of the Indo-
nesia national legal system. Also it is a historical fact that Islamic
courts had existed in and been attached to many Islamic kingdoms
long before the establishment of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia.
Along with the establishment of this rule, the Dutch restricted the
role and authority of the Islamic courts in an attempt to weaken
Islam and the Muslims at that time. Despite the fact that during the
independence era improvements needed to continue in order to fully
serve Muslim interests in this field. In an effort to achieve this, in
1985 President Soeharto took the initiative of establishing the Project
for the Compilation of Islamic law, with the aim of composing stan-
dardized legal books to be used by Islamic judges in settling legal
problems and cases arising among the Muslim community.
The idea of establishing the Project was motivated by the fact that
the legal writings upon which Indonesia's Islamic judges based their
decisions were products of the 'ulaml' of the medieval period, and
v/ere no longer suitable because of the demands of modern times.
The Project succeeded in drafting three standardized books on Is-
lamic law: the first dealing with marriage, the second inheritance,
and the third endowments. The composition of these three drafts,
which involved prominent 'ulaml' and many leading experts in Is-
lamic law, was completed in 1987. At the final stage, these three drafts
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were critically and thoroughly discussed in a workshop attended by
many 'ulamX' and experts in Islamic law and, on the basis of their
suggestions, the drafts were then completed. Vith the government's
promulgation of Law No. 7 of 1989 on Islamic religious courts (which
will be discussed), these three standardized books on Islamic law were
ready for use. By referring to these three books, legal decisions on
similar cases made by Islamic judges in Islamic courts throughout the
country could be standardized, thus avoiding situations where differ-
ent decisions were produced by different Islamic courts.256
The promulgation by the government of Law No. 7 of 1989 can
be traced back to the issuance of Law No. 14 of t970, which stipu-
lates that the decisions of the public courts, Islamic religious courts,
military courts, and administrative courts must be carried out by the
courts concerned. However, according to the judicial system in In-
donesia, the decisions implemented by these four courts defer to the
Supreme Court. As a follow up to Law No. 14 of.1970, on December
29,7989, the government promulgated Law No.7 of 1989 regulating
the status, role and authority of the Islamic religious courts. With the
promulgation of this law, important fundamental improvement and
a substantial restructuring of the Islamic courts were carried out.
Sjadzali said that in 1945 an Isiamic party had proposed that the KNIP
(Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, or Central Indonesian National
Committee), which served as the provisional parliament at that time,
improve the position of the Islamic courts, but all factions in the
Committee strongly rejected its proposal.s/ According to Sjadzali, it
was only in the New Order period, when the Islamic parties no longer
existed, that improvements were made in the Islamic courts. These
improvements, as Munawir Sjadzali has noted as below, had a special
strategic meaning for Muslims in relation to the government's poli-
cies towards them. Sjadzali mentioned four important points in rela-
tion to the restructuring of the Islamic religious courts.
First, all Islamic religious courts, of which there are number 304
throughout the country, are regulated by and foiiow only a single
law, that is, Law No. 7 o{ 7989. This law marks the end of ail restric-
tions imposed by the Dutch upon the Islamic religious courts in Java
and Madura since L882, and on the Islamic religious courts in South
Kalimantan since 1937.(these restrictions were nor substantially
changed until the promulgation of this law). Second, legal decisions
made by the Islamic religious courrs are final in the sense rhar rhey
do not need to be confirmed by the public courts as had previously
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been the practice. Decisions are executed by the Islamic religious
courts themselves, no longer by the public courts. For this reason,
the position of bailiff was established in the Islamic religious courts.
Third, judges in the Islamic religious courts system,like state judges,
are appointed by the President, no longer by the Minister of Reli-
gious Affairs. The position, rights and facilities given to Islamic judges
by the state are the same as those given to other judges in other courts.
The possibility exists, at least in theory, for an Islamic judge to be
appointed by the President to serve as head of the Supreme Court.
Fourth, the positions of judge, secretary and bailiff in the Islamic
religious courts system are given exclusively to Muslims.s8
According to Sjadzali, with these substantial improvements and
restructuring, the position of the Islamic religious courts in Indone-
sia is very soiid and even prestigious when compared with that of
Islamic courts in many other Muslim countries. Even in Muslim coun-
tries which have Islam as their constitutional basis, the position of
Islamic courts is not as strong or prestigious as it is in Indonesia.
This, according to Sjadzali, can be seen from the fact that Islamic
courts in these countries exist only in certain states or regions, have
limited authority, and have no standing within the central govern-
ment.25e
It should be noted that when the Islamic religious courts bill was
proposed, and then formally submitted to the DPR by the govern-
ment for approval, the PGI began to voice strong opposition. The
PGI sent a statement to the executives and factions of the DPR in
which it expresed its objections that (a) in line with the "Archipelago
Insight" (IVawasan Nusantara), only one national law should be ap-
plied to serve the national interest; (b) a bill on the Islamic religious
courts was beyond the DPR's jurisdiction, since it was the responsi-
bility of the entire nation to lay down a basic framework in the legal
field; and (c) the bill was in "contradiction" with Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution in a pure sense.2@
Through their magazine Hidup (Life), Christians charged that the
proposed bill on Islamic religious courts constituted an attempt to
revive theJakarta Charter and was discriminatory towards non-Mus-
lim groups in the legal domain.261 Indeed, this issue became so sensi-
tive that it aroused strong opposition from the Protesranr and Catho-
lic elements in the Golkar faction during the DPR sessions. In the
face of this issue Golkar, which was usually solidly united, was al-
most split. In response to this opposition, President Soeharto firmly
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stated that the government intended the proposed bill to protect the
rights of Muslims to perform the entire range of their 'ibadar (which
consist of far more than just prayers, fasting and the paying alms) as
proposed in article 29 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution.262 In the
meantime, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, ap-
pealed to the DPR to approve the bill, arguing that Muslims urgentiy
needed a new law on Islamic religious courts due to the process of
national legal development. Sjadzali believed that this law, which
would be exqlusively applied to Muslims, would not disturb, let alone
violate, the interests of other religious groups in the country. He
asked that the birth and execution of the law to be understood by
non-Muslim communities and that they accept this developmenr.16l
Thanks to the ABRI faction's lobbying of irs opponents in the DPR,
the bill was finally passed.
The Establisbment of ICMI and the Rise of Muslim Participation in
Politics
Another of the governmenr's policies which was considered to be
in line with Musiim aspirations was its official supporr for the estab-
Iishment of ICMI (lkaian Cendekiawan Muslirn Iidonesia, or Associa-
tion of Indonesia Muslim Intellectuals). ICMI was established in Malang,
East Java, following a symposium on "Developing Indonesian Soci-
ety in the 21" Century" held ar the University of Brawijaya on De-
cember 6-8,1990 by a group of Muslims concerned with the develop-
ment of Muslim intellectual activities in the country. President
Soeharto himself, accompanied by a number of his Minisrers such as
Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie and Emil Salim, delivered an important
speech in which he encouraged Muslims to play an acrive role in
enlightening the nation and in developing its abilities in the face of
the challenge of modernity in the 21" century. B.J. Habibie (b. 1936),
State Minister of Research and Technology, a graduate of the Uni-
versity of Aachen in Vest Germany and inrernationally known as
an expert in the construction of aircraft, was elecred as the General
Chairman of ICMI.
It was reported that Habibie's appointmenr ro the Chairmanship
of ICMI was supported by the Presidenr, who considered him ca-
pable and suitable for the position. At a symposium prior ro rhe es-
tablishment of ICMI, Habibie presented a paper entitled "The Role
of Science and Technoiogy in the Process of Social Transformation"
in which he stressed, among other thing, that Indonesians should
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work to free themselves from illiteracy in science and technology,
because only a country with the ability to develop new technology
and science in concert with its culture can survive.24 Quoting a state-
ment by the President, Habibie called for Muslims to make
"Indonesia's Second long-term Twenty-five Year Development Pro-
gram" a starting point for "the second phase of national awakeDing.":r's
The establishment of ICMI was widely welcomed, and a number of
branches or organization units both, within the country and abroad,
were established by Muslim students and intellectuals.
According to its constitution, one of the goals of ICMI is to im-
prove the quality of Muslim intellectual life and to encourage the
participation of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in the national de-
velopment process in order to create a peaceful, just and prosperous
community blessed by God in the spirit of the 1945 Constitution.26
The ICMI also established a comprehensive program of activities,
consisting of 13 points, the most significant five being:
(1) To participate actively in the deveiopment of education and hu-
man resources with the aim of developing the inteliectual capac-
ity of the nation, especially that of the Muslim community;
(z)To improve the quality of its members and to develop their ex-
pertise through coordination of information and communication
nerworks among intellectuals, institutions and organizations within
the country and abroad;(:)fo promote ideas, research and studies which are innovative,
strategic and anticipative; and to make serious attempts in solving
local, regional and national problems;
(+)To promote library and documentation centers, and to develop
integrated communication and information networks with the
objective of collecting, storing, processing, and distributing in-
formation in the fields of science, technology and human resources,
as well as social, economic, legal and cultural affairs; and
(s) To promote Islamic economic and financial institutions through,
among other means, the mobilization of founds, management of fi-
nanciaicapital, banks, cooperatives, small busineses, alms, and other
legal means.ry
In view of irc program, it is clear that ICMI has taken a strategic step
and has shown itself to be an intellectual movement which is concerned
with developing the nation and Muslim intellectual abilities, and eievat-
ing the nation's scientific capacity at the eve of the 21" century.
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Observing the new relationship between Muslims and the gov-
ernment, Kuntowijoyo (b.19a3), a well-known hisrorian reaching ar
Gadjah Mada University, has voiced the opinion that this develop-
ment will change the political discourse in Indonesia. In his view, if
ICMI is any indication, new rrends in cooperation are raking place in
the life of the Muslim community. Firstly, the culrural dichoromy
between abangans and santis has ended. Thanks ro the realization of
Islamic religious education in the state schools, the children of the
both abangans and santris receive an identical program of religious
education. Meanwhile, rhe new curricula, introducing non-religious
subjects, are taught in pesantrens, the center of traditional hlamic
education. Thus, cultural exclusivism is no longer the norm.
Secondly, according ro Kuntowijoyo, a dichotomy no longer ex-
ists between traditionalist Muslims and Modernist Muslims. Religious
education at all levels has altered fundamentally due ro rhe use of the
governmenr's srandardized text which put aside the issue of religious
distinctions. Furrhermore, rhe publication and circulation of a great
number of religious book representing various religious viewpoints
has made Muslims face complex ideas and choices, resulting in i blur-
ring of the differences berween the two positions.
Thirdly, the dichotomy berween the'ulamA' and Muslim intellec-
tuals, who, by 1952, had become so polarized that ir caused rhe NU
to leave the Masyumi, is no longer felt. Today, rhe 'ulaml' sit to-
gether with Muslim intellectuals in various discussions, conferences
and seminars, both sides contributing fully.
Fourthly, the dichotomy between the religious group and the
"secular" faction has also ended. Today, there are many Muslim in-
tellectuals who are concerned with secular matters, from population
control and the environment to literature, arr and sporrs. The bound-
ary between secularity and religiosity in the life of an Indonesian
Musiim has become blurred and is in danger of disappearing.
Lastly, Kuntowijoyo srares that the aiplication'by th."gorr.rn-
ment of the mass organizations law of 1985 terminated the distinc-
tion between Islamic and non-Islamic parties. This can be seen from
the fact that the 'uiaml'' gave permission to members of the Muslim
community to vore for any political party they wanted to in general
elections.268 Pointing to the composition of the central board of icMI,
Kuntowijoyo nores that its membership varies and consists of indi-
viduals who are affiliated with various political srreams. Thus it can
be said that Islam and bureau cracy go hand in-hand-in Indonesian
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politics, and that this development, in Kuntowijoyo's view, marks
the end of the myth of Muslims as trouble makers and protesters in
Indonesia.26e
\(hile the majority of Muslims enthusiastically show their sup-
port and sympathy for ICMI, there are some Muslim individuals who
are opposed to it. Abdurrahman'Wahid, for example, who refused an
important position on the Advisory Board of ICMi, claimed that
many who joined ICMI were opportunistic, and were just looking
for positions and rewards from the government through participa-
tion in this organization. \7ahid v/as even "suspicious of the project
(read: ICMI) because it had the stamp of Soeharto."uo Deliar Noer,
who has been critical of government policies from the very begin-
ning, viewed the establishment of ICMI and other events, which are
seen by Muslims as reflecting good relations between them and the
government, as being good in appearance only, and intended by the
government to serve only a temporary purpose.Tl Chalid Mawardi
(a parliamentary member from the PPP faction) questioned the po-
litical interests behind the foundation of ICMI.Z2 Answers to these
doubts may yary depending on who responds to it and his/her
political views and background. One can argue that one of the
political interests behind the establishment of ICMI (and other
government-sponsored Islamic activities and programs) was to le-
gitimize, strengthen and perpetuate the power of the regime by
providing more services to Muslims. Furthermore, one can also
argue that the regime is very much concerned with Muslims since
they constitute a significant majority of the population (87 per-
cent), and are thus deserving of much more attention and services
than other groups.
Such are the new developments which, in the eyes of the majority
of Muslims, reflect an improved relationship between Islam and the
regime.It was in view of these developments that President Soeharto,
his wife (Mrs. Tien Soeharto) and other members of his family, ac-
companied by some of his Ministers, performed the pilgrimage io
the holy city of Mecca in t99t, a year before the implementation of
rhe 1992 general election and two years before the Presidential elec-
tion. The timing of this event prompted observers, both within the
country and abroad, to observe that Soeharto's pilgrimage to Mecca
was political, and that he was thereby seeking to obtain Islamic legiti-
macy in order to be re-elected. However, it was widely reported that
his pilgrimage to Mecca had nothing to do with politics, but was
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purely a religious impulse to seek God's favour.T3 Muslims showed
their support for the President's decision to finally make the hojj,uo
having previously only performed the 'umrah in 1977.
Although Soeharto's pilgrimage did not appear to have a political
motivation, it did have a political implication, which increasingly
convinced Muslims to support him in his bid for re-election as Presi-
dent. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Kyai BadriMasduki,
the head of the Badridduja pesantren at Probolinggo, East Java, who
collected more than 1,000 signatures from influential byaisand'ulamA'
in East Java supporting Soeharto's re-election as President in the 1993
MPR general session.275 In the meantime, Alamsjah Ratu
Perwiranegara (a retired army general and former Minister of Reli-
gious Affairs) who later became know as the leading figure of the
Group of Twenty-One also campaigned for Soeharto's re-election, as
noted by Michael R.J. Vatikiotis:
Alamsjah's chief weapon in persuading the Muslim faithful ... highlights
the extent to which individuals rather than social forces dominate the politi
cal scene. Alamsjah spread alarm among the Muslim clergy by casting Benny
Moerdani [Minister of Defense] as the only alternative. Moerdani's Chris-
tian faith, ded to his implication in the brutal suppression of a Muslirn riot
in Tanjung Priok in Septernber 1984, was effective in persuading rnany Mus-
lims that Soeharto had to remain in power ro prevenr the Republic being
ruled hy an "infidel".'o
In the !992 general election, the PPP obtained only 17 percent of
the vote, while"Golkar recei.rei 68 percent and the pOt tS percent.tt
In spite of this, more interestingly, the PPP unanimousiy supported
Soeharto's re-election as President (and nominated Try Sutrisno as
Vice-President); its support had been voiced before other parties an-
nounced their Presidential candidates. The re-election of Soeharro
became a realitywhen the MPR, in its 1993 general session appointed
him again a President, granting him his sixth term to end in 1998.
Soeharto is currently accompanied by Try Sutrisno (former Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) as Vice-President.
It is interesting to nore rhar, of the 40 ministers who sit on the
sixth development cabinet which he established after his most recenr
re-election, 38 are Muslim.z8 Commenting on this, K.H. Hasan Basri
of the MUI said that the cabinet's composirion reflect the real situa-
tion existing in the country, where Muslims have become more ad-
vanced in politics, economics, the military, and other fields.Te Dr.
Juwono Sudarsono, an expert in political science and a prominent
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lecturer at the University of Indonesia, has said that the Muslims are
now truly represented in the cabinet, and that they now have a great
opportunity to take part in state affairs as policy-makers.2e Unlike in
the past, when the President appointed his Ministers from among
socialist technocrats, secular nationalists and Christians, in the Sixth
Development Cabinet he has now turned to Muslims to fill strategic
positions. K.H. Hasan Basri appealed to the Muslims who sit in the
cabinet to carry out their duties as effectively as possible, to Prove
themselves capable of meeting their responsibilities and not to disap-
point the President who had entrusted these positions; to them.281
The rise in the participation of Muslims in Indonesian politics has
generated concern in Christian circles. An anxious Christian Indo-
nesian once told Donald K. Emmerson, a professor in political sci-
ence at the University of W'isconsin, that "if things keep going this
way, there is a 50o/o to 600/o chance my country could be an Islamic
state by 2010.282 Emmerson believes that such concern is simply an
exaggeration since "militant Muslims will not dictate the direction of
Indonesian politics anytime soon 
- 
if ever. Islam's emergence in In-
donesia, a country I have been visiting and studying for a quarter of
a century, is an understandable consequence of the nation's political
stability and economic growth."2s Thus, according to Emmerson,
the increasing role of Muslims in Indonesian politics should be viewed
as a natural growth in line with their continued success in improving
the quality of their social, educational and economic life. Due to this
success, many Muslims are now highly educated in science and tech-
nology, and this should be recognized by the government by ap-
pointing them to appropriate positions in the state. In Emmerson's
view, the assumption that a Muslim officer will place the interests of
political Islam over those of the armed forces is baseless. As he puts it:
Times have changed. After two decades of stable government and aver-
age annual economic growth of 60lo, Islamic identiry is now peaceftrlly on
the rise. In the shadow of factories, mosques have sprung up. In traffic-iammed
cities like Jakarta, Muslirns messages circulate with frequency in popular
rnagazines and newspapers, on audio and video tapes,..
Into these signs of Islamic identity some Indonesians rnight read a seri-
ons drreat to religious harmony in the country, But such a reading seerns
alarrnist to me. Militant Islamists are not taking over Indonesia. The propor-
tion of top echelon officers in the armed forces who are Muslims, for ex-
ample, has gone up. But in a country where nearly nine out of every 10
peopie acknowledge Islam as their faith, this shouid come as no surpnse.
The assurnption that a Muslim officer would put the interests of political
Islam above those of the armed forces as a national institution is unfounded.
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The same logic holds true, I believe, when it comes to Mr. Soeharto's
government. In the 41 person Cabinet installed last March, only three Min-
isters are Chrisdan, down from six in the previous government. But the new
proportion, atTo/o,is not much less than the 10% of the population that is
Christian. By naming two Christians to high posu outside the Cabinet, more-
over, Mr, Soeharto seems to have tried to reassure Western governments and
Christian Indonesians that he is not about to exclude religious minorities
{rom representation, let alone countenance an Islamic state. The academic
Johannes Sumarlin and Adm. Sudomo, Catholics who held posts in the last
cabinet, now head the Audit Board and Supreme Advisory Council' respec-
tively. The appointment of a Hindu-Balinese General, Ida Bagus Sudfana, as
Minister of Mining and Energy further undercuts the notion that Jakarra is
tilting toward political Islam.28a
From the above quotation, it can be said that in spite of the in-
creased participation of Muslims in Indonesian politics, it should not
be concluded that Indonesia is leaning toward political Islam.
Emmerson is correct when he says that President Soeharto "gave no
indication that he might be reorienting his ship of state toward Mecca.
The country's constitutional guarantee of religious freedom remains
intact."285 Emmerson's argument found a solid basis when President
Soeharto in 1993 reaffirmed that "Indonesia is neither a religious nor
a secular state. ... The government will not meddle in people's inter-
nal religious beliefs, including their understanding, perceplion and
institutionalization of their religions. Religious faith is a matter of
inner consciousness of respective religious followers, and the state
therefore respects and fully guarantees the practice by the peopie of
this fundamental right."2%
Commenting on Habibie's appointmenb the Chairman of ICMI and
the role of the organization itself, Emmerson says that Habibie's great-
est concern is economic and that he, together with ICMI, does not want,
nor will he encourage, any project to Islamize Indonesia. Furthermore,
as far as President Soeharto is concerned, he supports ICMI since he
wants the support of ICMI thinkers and leaders in return:
Mr. Soeharto's ciecision to allow his Minister of Research and Technol-
ogy, BJ. Habibie, to head-and thereby legitimate-ICMl has also worried
the alamrists. ICMI is known to have in its ranks metnbers who favor a
greater role for Islam in Indonesian life. But Mr. Habibie, in rn,v estirnation,
cloes not want, and will not encourage, an extension of this agentla into a
project to Islarnize the state. His goal is largely economic : Mr. Habibie
hopes to mobilize ICMI and its Muslirn scholars' influence behind advanced
industrial development and leap-frog his country into a high-tech future.
Mv guess is that the organization has received Mr. Soeharto's support be-
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cause he wanm the support of Muslim thinkers and leaders, and also because
Mr. Habibie is an old friend.287
The greater roie of Islam in Indonesian politics should be seen as
a reflection of the importance of the position of Muslims as a major-
ity group, whose abilities have become increasingly advanced in vari-
ous fields. Emmerson puts this PersPective into context by observing
that, in fact, "Indonesia's gains are Islam's, too. 188
Conclusion
Under Soeharto, the implementation of the national development
program intensified, and achieved strategic momentum when Indo-
nesia declared itseif to be entering the "take-off' stage. Indonesian
formally began its Long-Term25Year Development Program in1969,
and is now entering a new era in which it is implementing its second
Long-T erm 25 Y ear Deve lop ment Program . In 199 4, Dr. Amien Rais,
a graduate of the University of Chicago, lecturer at Gajah Mada Uni-
versity and an expert in political science, presented an assessment of
Soeharto's leadership mentioning five achievements and five weak-
nesses.lP
Soeharto's first achievement in Rais's view was his success in main-
taining financial stability, which resulted in economic growth. In
1967 Indonesia's GNP per capita was 70 US dollars, but today it is
600 US dollars. In I97O,60 percent of Indonesians lived below the
poverty line, but today this has decreased to 15 percent. Thus,
Indonesia's average annual economic growth has been between 6.5-7
percent under his ieadership. Second, Soeharto has also succeeded in
preserving national security and political stability. Under his leader-
ship there have been no major disturbances or serious separatist move-
ments, and only minor upheavals, such as in Dili (East Timor) or in
the Tanjung Priok aff.air, all of which are now under control. Third,
Soeharto has succeeded in strengthening the unity and integrity of
his narion, which is pluralistic in religion, ethnicity, culture and tra-
dition. The national motto " Bhinneha Tunggal lka" (Unity in Diver-
sity) exists not only as a slogan, but also in reality' This situation is
very important in view of the many foreign countries which have
undergone serious political turmoil because of ethnic conflicts or Po-
litical rivalry. A few examples are Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and
India. Fourth, under Soeharto, Indonesia has succeeded in carrying out
its agricultural program as witnessed by the fact that it has achieved self-
sufficiency in food (rice). Fifth, the image of Indonesia in the eyes of the
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international community is good, as indicated by the fact that, for in-
stance, it has been entrustedwith the Chairmanship of the Non-Aligned
Block. Also, Indonesia played a strategic role as intermediary in settiing
political conflicts in Cambodia and the Philippines.
On the other hand, according to Rais, the Soeharto government's
first weakness lies in the fact that under irs leadership the gap be-
tween "the haves" and "the have nots" has remained very wide. The
condition of those who live below the poverty line is very serious,
while the conglomerates enjoy to an excessive degree the counrry's
wealth and the fruits of its development. Second, the rate of corrup-
tion in the government is high. Rais points to Prof. Soemitro
Djojohadikoesoemo's (a prominent economisr) estimation that about
30 percent of development program funds are wasted or diverted by
corrupt officials. Third, proteoion for laborers is very poor. Labor-
ers do not haye the right to launch strikes against their employers'
policies. Fourth, in settling many land disputes berween the haves
and the have-nots, the government often takes the side of rhe haves. In
many cases, the have-nots are nor sufficiently protected. Fifth, there is
chronic nepotism in the country. This is a situation which is not easily
corrected. Rais has urged that regeneration of the government must take
place in the immediate future if this nepotism is ever ro be overcome.
The strength of Soeharto's leadership iies in the fact that ir com-
bines three key elements: the enforcement of national ideology
(Pancasila), political stability and economic growth. These three key
elements are closely interrelated and cannot be separated from one
another. Vith the application of Pancasila as the basis and national
ideology of the state, the socialization of P4 and the stipulation of
Pancasiia as the sole foundation for all political Danies and mass or-
ganizations, the posirion of Pancasila his beco-e very srrong in the
lives of Indonesians. Ideologically speaking, this condition will per-
sist long into the future, alongside the continuous process of social
transformation which has been taking place in the life of the Indone-
sia people. Dr. Alfian, an experr in political science and a graduate of
the University of Wisconsin, has analyzed Pancasila in relation to
social change in Indonesia life. He describes the elements which are
essential to any successful ideology. His conclusions on the matter
will be summarized here.2{
First, an ideology should have the "dimension of realiry." This is
necessary since an ideology reflects a reai situation existing in a par-
ticular society, it being most important when that ideology is first
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formulated and introduced to people. Pancasila, according to Alfian,
clearly reflects this kind of real situation. Vhen the Indonesia politi-
cal leaders in 7945 discussed what kind of ideology should serve as
the basis for the independent state of Indonesia, rhey first tried to
understand the basic nature of Indonesia society, which is pluralistic
with regard to religion, ethnicity, culture, tradition and politics. Alfian
says that Pancasila embraces all these values and ideas, as is indicated
by, for example, its first principle (Belief in One God). This central
principle serves as a point of agreement for all segments of Indone-
sian society, regardless of their religious beliefs. Vith this principle,
as well as the other four, Pancasila is made acceptabie to all the diverse
groups in Indonesian society, allowing it to regulate their national life
and bring them together in harmony and peace. To borrow A. H. Johns,
"Pancasila is the answer to such diversity."'1In Aifian's view, Pancasila,
as an ideolog/, has the capacityto continue to survive and can be devel-
oped for the sake of togetherness in the life of the narion.
Second, an ideology should have the "dimension of idealism." lVhat
Alfian means by this is that an ideology should contain clear aspira-
tions and firm ideals from which its supporters may draw the moti-
vation, capacity and strength ro work rogerher to build a better life.
Alfian is of the opinion that Pancasila meers this requiremenr. How-
ever, he sees that there has been a tendency in Indonesia society,
especially during the Old Order regime, to pur special emphasis on
one of the five principles of Pancasila over rhe orhers. For example,
one group emphasized the importance of democracy or humanitari-
anism, while other groups stressed the significance of Belief in One
God. This kind of approach does not see Pancasila as a whole, or as
an interrelated set of values. This tendency was recognized by the
New Order government, and for this reason it felt the need to estab-
lish P4 to elaborate fully all the principles of Pancasila.
Third, an ideoiogy should contain the "dimension of flexibility."
This dimension reflects the ability of an ideology to adapt itself to
the process of social change and growth in which it finds itself. While
adapting itself, at the same rime it colors and directs the process of
social change in accordance with the ideals of the society or narion in
question. Alfian explains that since the process of social rransforma-
tion is always taking place in the life a society, conrinuous and accu-
rate interpretations of an ideology are imperative. In his view, theo-
retically and formaily speaking, Pancasila meers rhis requirement.
For example, he points ro rhe "Explanarion of the 1945 Constiru-
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tion" which states that the Constitution, which contains only 37 chap-
ters, is brief and elastic in nature. The issues not covered in the con-
stitution can be dealt with by the government by issuing laws, bilis,
regulations and decrees based on the principles of Pancasila in accor-
dance with the demands and needs of the nation. Here it should be
added that the President and government officials have, since 1985,
begun to speak of Pancasila as an open ideology, in the sense that its
basic spirit and values as well as its fundamental ideas are unchanged,
but that these values and ideas can be developed creatively and dy-
namically.2e2'Sflithin this context, Pancasila can accept other values
coming from other nations as long as they do not challenge the basic
values of Pancasila itself. In this way, Pancasila, according to the Presi-
dent and government officials, will not become frozen, but will al-
ways be creative, dynamic and relevant in response to the process of
social transformation taking place in the lives of Indonesians.2e3
Vith the acceptance of Pancasila as the ideology to be applied in
state and social affairs, there seem to be no further major ideological
issues relating to Pancasila which Muslims (or other groups) can chal-
lenge. The central issue surrounding Pancasila, which has now be-
come the main concern of the government, is how the nation as a
whole can fortify its loyalty to the state ideology. In line with this
concern, President Soeharto, in a speech delivered int993 inaugurat-
ing the new campus of Pancasila University of Jakarta, urged the
nation to strengthen its aliegiance to the state ideology in order to be
able to face the future challenges of modernization. Without loyalty
to Pancasila, he emphasized, the Indonesia nation will be bewildered
amidst dynamic and radical global changes. Stressing the importance
of each principle of Pancasila ds)-:oisthe radical and dynamic changes
resulting from rapid globalization, Soeharto said that if the Indonesia
peopie did not believe in God (the first principle of Pancasila), ethics,
morality and spirituality wouid be ignored. Vithout the values of
just and civilized humanitarianism (the second principle of Pancasila),
progress in economics, technology and sciences would deteriorate.
Echoing the third principie of Pancasila, he said that the nation could
be split by internal conflicts if it did not adhere to the principle of
national unity. In addition, authoritarian forces would emerge and
bring the nation down if the values of democracy-the fourth prin-
ciple of Pancasila-were ignored. Finally, economic progress could
widen the social gap and create unrest if people neglected the values
of social justice, the fifth principle of Pancasila.2%
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